

Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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FBIS-AFR-89-154 *11 August 1989*

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Frontline Summit Opens 10 Aug in Lusaka

MB1008142089 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1200 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Another Frontline State meeting began in Lusaka this morning. Because of difficulties with the telephone lines, our correspondents were forced to send their report by telex. Luis Fernando now reads it:

[Fernando] The State House in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, is again hosting a meeting of the supreme leaders of the Frontine States. Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, and Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi are discussing southern African political developments. Botswana is represented at the meeting by Foreign Minister Gaositwe Chiepe because, according to reports, President Quett Masire suffered a sprain and is unable to attend the meeting.

The summit began at 1030 with the temperature at 20 degrees centigrade. It is analyzing issues related to the implementation of Angola's internal peace plan and the Mozambican Government's efforts to (?implement) an internal peace plan in that country.

As is well known, Angolan peace talks resumed in (?Kinshasa), Zaire, on 8 August. Radio Angola has a correspondent there.

With regard to Mozambique, we know only that the delegation of Mozambican religious officials negotiating with Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] has already presented the Mozambican Government's peace plan.

At the beginning of the meeting in Lusaka today, Zambian President Kenneth David Kaunda, who is also chairman of the Frontline States, said SWAPO [South-West Africa People's Organization] President Sam Nujoma would brief the meeting on the current situation in northern Namibia and the electoral process in the territory; ANC [African National Congress] General Secretary Alfred Nzo will speak about the situation in South Africa in general, and the country's democratization in particular; and Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano will report to his counterparts on efforts to implement a peace plan in his country.

Zambian President Kaunda ended his speech by stressing that the Angolan Government's national and regional peace efforts encourage him to continue the struggle to radically change the situation in southern Africa.

It should be noted that OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim is also attending this Frontline meeting.

Kaunda-De Klerk Talks Announced

MB1008192389 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] At the end of a Frontline State meeting today, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda said that he will meet Frederik de Klerk, the future president of South Africa, probably on 28 August [words indistinct] in Zambia.

The possibility of establishing dialogue with the Pretoria regime was one of the principal issues under discussion at the summit. However, President Kenneth Kaunda did not (?reveal) the position of the Frontline States, which will be presented to a OAU commission for southern Africa, which will convene in the Zimbabwean capital on 21 August.

In the course of the summit, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos briefed his Frontline counterparts on ongoing contacts between the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] elements at (?Sokele) under the mediation of Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko. It has also been learned that the Zairian head of state sent a message to the Frontline States with information on new and favorable developments for the Angolan people.

The Frontline leaders met in Lusaka today to discuss regional issues in general, and the situation in South Africa and Angola's and Mozambique's peace initiatives in particular. The summit also discussed Namibia's independence.

8 Countries To Meet 22 Aug on Angolan Peace

MB1108092689 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0800 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announced that the eight African countries that initiated the Angolan peace process will meet in Harare on 22 August.

Kaunda was speaking during the Frontline summit in Lusaka yesterday.

The Zambian president said that President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire had sent a message to the summit concerning new favorable developments of the Angolan plan.

Zaire

Angolan Peace Talks Suspended After One Session

AB1008093089 London BBC World Service in English 0730 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "African News" program]

[Text] The peace talks between Angola's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government and the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels, which resumed in Zaire yesterday, are said to have been suspended after one session amid reports of a disagreement over the substance of the peace agreement reached in Gbadolite in late June.

Meanwhile, the Angolan Government has again accused UNITA of violating the cease-fire. For its part, it said that while observing the cease-fire, the government forces have undertaken what it called preventative and punitive actions against UNITA.

UNITA Expresses 'Confidence' in Gbadolite Plan

AB1008185589 Kinshasa AZAP in French 1730 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Kinshasa, 10 Aug AZAP—Mr Jorge Valentin, minister of information and leader of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola [UNITA] delegation to the Angolan national reconciliation negotiations that are under way in Kinshasa, has termed as a false report the statement published by a Portuguese newspaper and attributed to Dr Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA.

In this connection, Mr Jorge Valentin read to the press a UNITA political committee communique signed by Dr Savimbi and which was received from Jamba on Wednesday [9 August] at 2030 [time not further specified]. Here is a text of the communique:

Communique from the UNITA Central Comittee Political Bureau:

1. UNITA categorically denies that its president told a Portuguese journalist that he did not agree with the Gbadolite declaration. UNITA has always given its support to the Gbadolite declaration, which calls for peace in Angola, national reconciliation, a cease-fire, and the constitution of a commission to study the modalities for implementing the two aforementioned principles.

2. What the UNITA president said was that he would not have gone to Gbadolite if it were only to discuss the peace plan of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

3. UNITA once again reaffirms its confidence in the Gbadolite declaration, and UNITA is contributing to overcome flaws and to have the distorted version of this declaration being promoted by some questionable circles stopped.

4. In order to avoid speculation and misunderstandings, UNITA believes that contacts between UNITA and MPLA are indispensable, and that political discussions should be conducted parallel to discussions on a cease-fire. Under these conditions, the mediator's mission would have been made easier.

Issued in Jamba on 9 August 1989
[Signed] UNITA President Dr Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, Army general

The UNITA information minister stated in a comment to the press that his party has confidence in the mediator, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, the founding chairman of the People's Movement of the Revolution. Mr Jorge Valentin stressed, "We know very well that negotiations are a very difficult and evolutionary process, and we believe that it is the responsibility of the two belligerent sides, UNITA and MPLA, to help the mediator by openly assuming their responsibility for the country's future."

He also pointed out that this is not the first time that UNITA has had problems with a Portuguese daily. In this regard he cited the case of a Portuguese newspaper's reports that UNITA's representative in Lisbon was reported to have confirmed during a 29 June interview the exile of Dr Savimbi to the United States [words indistinct] South Africa.

This false information was denied by other representatives of the movement. In conclusion, Mr Jorge Valentin stated that the current problems will be overcome in the interests of African and continental unity.

Angola's Dos Santos Arrives 11 Aug for Talks

AB1108121589 Kinshasa AZAP in French 1200 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Kinshasa, 11 Aug (AZAP)—Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos arrived here at 0930 to hold talks with his Zairian counterpart, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko. The Angolan head of state is accompanied by his minister of external relations, Pedro de Castro Van Dunen Loy; and his deputy minister of external relations, Venancio de Mura. He was welcomed upon his arrival by Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko.

Ethiopia

Further on Search for Aircraft, Mickey Leland

'No Clue Yet' About Aircraft's Fate

EA1008191089 Addis Ababa in English to Neighboring Countries 1530 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Concerted efforts are continuing in the search for the RRC [National Relief and Rehabilitation Commission] aircraft which disappeared while on a flight from Addis Ababa to Gambela on Monday [7 August]. The Air Transport Authority here in Addis Ababa said that the area being covered by the search, which is going on for the 3d day running, has been widened and that six aircraft have now been deployed.

Pilots involved in the search said that they had not been able to make much progress because of dense forests in Ilubabor Administrative Region, western Ethiopia. Another problem impeding the search was the seasonal cloudy and foggy weather, the pilots said.

There is no clue yet about the aircraft, in spite of the deployment by the Ethiopian Government of rescue planes from the Air Force, the airlines, and the RRC. A U.S. C-141 medical evacuation plane arrived from West Germany here in Addis Ababa last night with 52 people to take part in the search operation, while another is expected tomorrow. The U.S. aircraft that joined the search operation is reported to have special equipment that could help in locating the missing aircraft.

Efforts Continue

AB1008175489 Paris AFP in French 1632 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Nairobi, 10 Aug (AFP)—The U.S. Air Force is taking part in the current search to find the aircraft carrying U.S. Congressman Mickey Leland that disappeared on Monday in western Ethiopia, it was announced today by a U.S. Embassy spokesman in Addis Ababa. Two C-130 aircraft are already at work alongside Ethiopian planes combing the border region between Ethiopia and Sudan as the search entered its 3d day. A high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft is expected to join in the effort today.

A C-141 hospital plane has arrived in Addis Ababa from the FRG and is on standby at the airport. Two experts from the U.S. Air Force specializing in research and rescue operations who arrived on board this plane are currently holding talks with their Ethiopian counterparts. Tomorrow a U.S. transport aircraft is expected to fly in bringing 4 MH-60 helicopters which will participate in the effort. Mr Mickey Leland, a 44-year-old Democrat and chairman of the special commission of the World Hunger Chamber, eight other Americans, and 7 Ethiopians were aboard the small aircraft, a Twin Otter, to visit a Sudanese refugee camp in Fugnido (about 50 km south of the Gambela provincial capital). All contact with the plane was lost 30 minutes after it took off from Addis Ababa, according to the ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY, ENA. Because of bad weather, the plane gave up a tentative landing attempt about 1 and ½ hours later in Dembidolo (110 km north of the camp).

Search May Extend to Sudan, Kenya

LD1008201589 Addis Ababa Ethiopian Television in English 1900 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Excerpt] The search for the missing Twin Otter-6 aircraft could be extended into the territories of neighboring countries of Sudan and Kenya provided permission from their governments is received.

This was stated by Comrade (Tasvie Itsagie), head of the technical section of the Civil Aviation Authority, in a briefing he gave to foreign journalists who had come to cover the missing plane, at [name indistinct] International Airport this afternoon.

In explaining the day-to-day development and outcome of the search, Comrade (Tasvie) noted that it is being carried out on a sectorial basis. He said that these areas in western Ethiopia were divided into 14 sectors in which 14 planes were deployed for the search. [passage omitted]

Mengistu Sends Message to Bush

EA1008191889 Addis Ababa in English to Neighboring Countries 1530 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] President Mengistu Haile Mariam today sent a message to President George Bush of the U.S. expressing deep concern about the safety of all persons aboard the plane, including a U.S. aid party, which has been missing since Monday while en route to a refugee camp in western Ethiopia. President Mengistu has also sent a similar message of concern to Congressman Thomas Foley, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, over the fate of all persons aboard the missing plane. President Mengistu said in his message that extensive rescue efforts will continue for the missing persons aboard the Twin Otter plane of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission with 16 persons on board, including a 3-man crew.

The plane was flying a U.S. aid party headed by Congressman Mickey Leland, Democrat, Texas, chairman of the U.S. Congress Select Committee on Hunger, from Addis Ababa to southwest Ethiopia to inspect the conditions of refugees at Fugnido camp, 100 km south of the town of Gambela.

President Mengistu's message to President Bush reads: We are deeply concerned about the safety of the congressman, Mickey Leland, and his party, and all those on board the plane who are missing after they left Addis Ababa by air on 7 August for Fugnido camp in southern Ethiopia. As soon as we learnt about this disturbing

development, we launched an extensive rescue effort by air and land involving government institutions and mass organizations, he said. We assure you, Mr President, that this effort will continue to the end, he said. Please accept, Mr President, the assurance of my highest consideration, he declared.

Somalia

SNM, Government Troops Fighting in Borama

NC1008161989 Paris AFP in English 1610 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Nairobi, Aug 10 (AFP) - Rebels of the Somali National Movement (SNM) have clashed with government troops on the streets of Borama close to the Ethiopian border in the north, informed sources said Thursday [10 August].

Some 500 rebels infiltrated the town to harass Army units and militiamen of the Gadabursi clan, who have been armed by Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre.

Some 200 people were killed and wounded in the fighting, the sources added, without saying which side was concerned.

The SNM operations, which began around Sunday, were apparently aimed at frightening the civilian population of Borama, mostly Gadabursi, away from the town before the rebels launched an all-out offensive.

Borama had previously been spared since the SNM stepped up operations in May last year.

Many Somalis have taken refuge in Ethiopia to escape the fighting, an official of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said in the Kenyan capital. Others, both civilians and soldiers, have fled towards the border with Djibouti at Guestir.

The SNM, which is fighting to end Major-General Barre's regime, in power for some 20 years, recruits mainly from the Issaq clan, which has never been able to reach an accord with the pro-Barre Gadabursi in spite of many meetings.

Rebel radio in mid-July told Borama's estimated 200,000 inhabitants to evacuate it by the end of the month.

An Army garrison is stationed there.

The Somali capital, Mogadishu, was the scene of anti-government rioting last month.

The authorities said 25 people were killed, but independent observers put the death toll at 300 to 400, killed either during the clashes or in summary executions afterwards as the authorities made sweeps through certain districts hunting down government opponents.

De Klerk To Meet With Kaunda in Zambia 28 Aug

MB1008181489 Johannesburg Television Service in English 1800 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Zambian President Dr Kenneth Kaunda has announced that he will meet the minister of national education, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, on 28 August in Zambia. Dr Kaunda, who has been holding talks with members of the so-called Frontline States, has offered to meet Mr De Klerk to discuss ways of ending apartheid.

Mr De Klerk, who is expected to succeed outgoing President P. W. Botha after the elections on 6 September, has said that he is committed to dismantling racial segregation in the country.

Asked whether the Frontline States believed the time was right to negotiate with Pretoria, President Kaunda said the summit had taken a decision on the issue. However, he declined to reveal what that decision was, saying the Frontline States would report to the Organization of African Unity's committee on southern Africa, which meets in Harare on 21 August.

The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha, confirmed tonight after consultations with the state president, Mr P. W. Botha, that he and Mr De Klerk would be meeting President Kaunda in Zambia on the 28 August. Mr Botha said that the meeting was a sequel to discussions with President Kaunda that the state president had initiated. He did not want to comment on the agenda for the meeting.

P.W. Botha Issues 'Terse Statement'

MB1108084389 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0836 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Cape Town August 11 SAPA—The state president, Mr P.W. Botha, issued a terse statement this morning saying he had no official knowledge of the intended visit to the president of Zambia, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, by the new National Party leader, Mr F.W. de Klerk, and the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha.

The statement, issued by the state president's office, said: "The state president, Mr P.W. Botha, has reacted to reports that certain South African ministers will meet Dr Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia on 28 August 1989.

The state president's statement reads:

"I am not aware, in terms of the rules governing overseas journeys by ministers, of the discussions to be held on 28 August as announced by Dr Kaunda."

Bophuthatswana Sentences 1988 'Coup' Plotters

MB1108095989 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0959 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Mmabatho Aug 11 SAPA—Members of the banned Peoples Progressive Party, who had been found guilty of treason, were sentenced to prison terms by Mr Justice E.A.T. Smith in the Supreme Court here today for their part in the abortive Bophuthatswana coup on February 10, 1988.

Mr Justice Smith sentenced A. Mataboge, K.H. Mereyothe, D.R. Morake, L. Mahila and R.T. Molefe to seven years imprisonment each and S. Bopalano, T.S. Motsoatsoa and K.S. Dlamini to seven years imprisonment each, of which two years were suspended for three years, on condition they were not found guilty of treason, sedition or other offences under the internal security act during that period.

Mr Justice Smith said he took into account in sentencing the eight the fact they were all men of status, some over 60 and most of them were in ill health. Six of them had been in prison for 18 months with the first three months in solitary confinement, one for one year and two months and the other for six months.

Three of them, Bopalano, Mosoatsoa and Dlamini, were over 60.

He had also taken into account that it was common cause they were not involved in the planning of the coup and that the first knowledge they had had of the coup was the rebel broadcast announcing the overthrow of the government early on February 10 1988.

Nevertheless, the hostile intent of the accused could not be taken lightly. They had assisted the coup ringleader, Rockey Malebane-Meitsing, on the day of the coup, and each had acquired knowledge of Mr Malebane-Meitsing's plans to overthrow the government.

* Minister Viljoen on Advances in Black Education

34000689b Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Jun 89 pp 77-78, 80, 82

[Interview with Dr Gerrit Viljoen, minister of education and development aid, by Riaan de Villiers: "Class Differences"; date, place not given]

[Text] "Of all the members of the Cabinet," Democratic Party MP [Member of Parliament] Peter Soal said in Parliament recently, "Dr Viljoen is, in all probability, the most intelligent, approachable and reasonable gentleman on the government benches."

This compliment from an opposition spokesman was by no means unusual. Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Education and Development Aid, is in the enviable position of being held in high esteem by colleagues and opponents

alike. A man of considerable intellect, he is regarded as one of the most capable men in the Cabinet. He has also been mentioned as a possible outside candidate for the state presidency.

Viljoen's status is the result of an unusual career path. No party hack, he initially pursued a distinguished academic career in the classics and served as the rector of Rand Afrikaans University for 12 years, from 1967 to 1979. During this period he also became chairman of the controversial Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond. His formal political career began in 1979 when he was appointed as administrator-general of the then South West Africa, but he was soon recalled to domestic politics as Minister of National Education.

In September 1984, he succeeded Dr Piet Koornhof as Minister for Co-operation, Development and Education. Viljoen did not serve as head of the old black affairs empire for long—large chunks of it were soon broken away and reallocated to other ministries as part of the general reshuffle. But in the course of a few eventful months, he found solutions for problems that had conspicuously eluded his predecessor for years—including legalising the presence of squatters in the Cape, and halting black spot removals.

These events did much to establish Viljoen's reputation as an important new reformist. He came to personify a new breed of political technocrat—a man capable of making sums and, in contrast with the old-style ideologues, acting on the answers.

From 1985 onwards, Viljoen remained in charge of black education and the homelands. These tasks were daunting enough—disaffection with the vilified "Bantu education" system had, in 1976, triggered off violent country-wide protest and revolt. And when unrest erupted throughout the country in the mid-1980s, much of it was once again centred around black schools.

Four years on, the state of black education has improved significantly. Political tensions have been defused; more schools and better trained teachers are being provided; more children are at school and their results have improved. The Viljoen imprint is unmistakable.

Much of this has been accomplished with a large increase in funds allocated to black education. This is one reason why, according to political observers, Viljoen is respected by his peers. Ministers have to compete for funds at Cabinet level. In winning so much money for this portfolio, Viljoen, they say, has achieved the near-impossible.

Viljoen is also respected, they say, because he is one of few people who have been prepared to stand up to P. W. Botha. But in contradiction to claims that Viljoen is an "F. W. man", they say he has consistently held himself aloof from faction-forming in the Cabinet.

It is for this reason that he has been regarded as a possible compromise candidate for the state presidency. While not charismatic, he is respected by all the factions in the National Party [NP].

For all this—or perhaps because of it—Viljoen is also something of an enigma. His political style is one of caution, discretion and propriety. He does not seek publicity; in fact he tends to withdraw whenever attention is focused on him. Often, this appears to be done deliberately, in order to cool down his political profile.

The result is, however, that Viljoen remains an unknown quantity. Observers agree that he has not asserted himself enough to become a really major political player; as yet, his promise remains unfulfilled.

And only the high personal esteem in which he is held has protected him to some extent against the damaging effects of the allegations of widespread corruption and malpractice in his department that are presently under investigation.

Here, he discusses the latest developments in black education—and the crucial question of black political empowerment—with Riaan de Villiers.

[LEADERSHIP] You recently announced that, for the first time, more blacks had passed matric exams at the end of last year than whites—some 84,000 blacks as against 62,000 whites. Was this an important milestone for you?

[Viljoen] Oh yes. A decade ago, only 6 percent of black pupils were at high schools. This has now gone up to 23 percent. This means that the retaining power of the schools has improved significantly—or that the dropout rate has lessened. The percentage of pupils in Standard 5 who eventually reach Standard 10 has also increased considerably. This means that the preparatory work at the primary schools must have improved. But it also means that the quality of the tuition at the secondary schools must have improved, otherwise the children would not have progressed to Standard 10.

The end result in the secondary schools is still very unsatisfactory, as evidenced by the pass rate of only 58 percent in the final examinations. But this is improving gradually. There are a significant number of schools where over 80 percent and, in some cases, even 100 percent of the pupils passed.

So I think there has been a remarkable improvement, in spite of the fact that most teachers have not received sufficient training and need upgrading.

Tensions and unrest at the schools have also decreased significantly. This is also evidenced by the fact that well over 90 percent of all potential candidates wrote the Standard 10 exams at the end of last year.

[LEADERSHIP] To what do you ascribe these improvements?

[Viljoen] I would say the most important contributory factor is probably the attitude among parents and in the black community in general that education is an absolutely essential instrument to a better quality of living. Also, the qualifications of teachers have been improved considerably by means of in-service training over the last few years. In some years, more than half of teachers in active service underwent some or other form of in-service training.

Teachers who do not have senior certificates can enroll at one of 51 circuit adult centres where they receive free tuition and study materials to enable them to obtain a senior certificate. The percentage of teachers without Standard 10 has dropped from 73 percent in 1983 to 40 percent in 1988.

The quality of pre-service training has, of course, been improved dramatically as well. Up to the publication of the De Lange report in 1981, most teachers had passed Standard 8, followed by a two-year teachers' diploma. On the recommendation of the commission the minimum qualification for all population groups has been raised to Standard 10, followed by a three-year diploma. In other words, in the course of one year—1984—the minimum level of training of new teachers jumped by three years.

[LEADERSHIP] These and other developments in black education seem to reflect a massive reconstruction or reform programme. Is this impression correct?

[Viljoen] Yes, definitely. It has been a part of President Botha's whole reform initiative. He was the first head of government who committed it to striving towards equal educational opportunities and standards for all people in South Africa, to the extent that this was within the financial capacity of the state.

The adoption of this point of departure—which was basically the major recommendation of the De Lange report—is of fundamental importance. It has led to a dramatic increase in the annual expenditure on black education. For a number of years, more than 70 percent of additional funds allocated to education has been allocated to black education, with far-reaching results. A few years ago, the per capita expenditure on white schoolchildren was about seven times higher than that on blacks. This ratio has narrowed until, last year, it was 4, 6 times higher. This is a very significant change.

Unfortunately, the increase during the latest fiscal year was not as dramatic, because of government attempts to restrict state expenditure. But we hope that expenditure on black education will again increase significantly in the near future.

[LEADERSHIP] What are the effects of the slowdown?

[Viljoen] It means that we cannot build as many additional classrooms or appoint as many additional teachers as we were able to in previous years, and are demanded by the growth of the school-going population.

There was a shortage of 7,959 classrooms in 1982. By last year, this had been cut down to 4,753—a very significant improvement.

In order to keep pace with the growth in the school-going population and wipe out the remaining backlog by 1997, we would need to build an absolute minimum of 2,716 classrooms every year. However, we will only be able to build 1,927 classrooms in the current financial year. This also falls short of the 2,144 new classrooms needed just to keep pace with the growth in pupil numbers this year.

[LEADERSHIP] What are the most urgent targets that still need to be met?

[Viljoen] Well, more schools and more classrooms. We would also like to have more graduated teachers—especially at the high schools. For this reason, we, and the self-governing territories, are giving bursaries to university students for educational and other qualifications. We are also upgrading our teacher training, and we want to raise the standards in our training colleges.

Another very important goal is to improve the child's school-readiness. The schools expect a certain level of modern, Western knowledge and standards of living from a child entering the system. In a less developed community, the home background and community circumstances of children are often less favourable. They have a built-in handicap in informal pre-school education, which experts say is very difficult to overcome. For this reason, we are now providing for a bridging period in the child's first school year. If tests show that he is not school-ready, he is put through a period of basic pre-school tuition. If necessary, this may last for a whole year.

Another very important target is that children must know that they have a reasonable chance of finding a job with their Standard 10 certificate. There is considerable unemployment at the moment, and there are even matriculated youngsters who cannot find the jobs they think they ought to find. This is partly due to the fact that the courses at black high schools are too theoretical. We are therefore busy implementing a more career-orientated, technically-orientated alternative stream, with the necessary guidance and advice to parents and children about choices of subject and career prospects.

[LEADERSHIP] You have often stated that you should be replaced by a black minister. What has brought you to this view?

[Viljoen] Well, for a considerable period now it has been the declared intention of the State President to bring black ministers or deputy ministers into government.

Legislation has been tabled in Parliament that will, if passed, enable him to do so. And I think Education and Training would be one of the obvious portfolios.

[LEADERSHIP] By when could a black minister be appointed?

[Viljoen] As you know, the legislation is currently being obstructed by the Labour Party, among others. At the moment—especially in the current election atmosphere—there is no indication that the positions of the parties in other houses will change on this issue. I would hope that it would happen as early as possible in the new year.

[LEADERSHIP] Another major development is your plan to establish a system of elected councils from school level upwards to national level. What is the background to this?

[Viljoen] There has been a central Council of Education and Training in the past that acted as an advisor to the department, but most members were nominated. We have now aimed at increasing the autonomy and the democratic nature of the council as far as possible.

The system begins with management councils, which replace the old school committees and are fully and democratically elected by parents. Then there is a committee of chairmen of management councils, which nominate representatives to regional committees. They, in turn, nominate members of the Council of Education and Training. So the eight representatives of regional committees on the council are ultimately democratically elected representatives of the community.

Some members of the council are, however, nominated by professional organisations such as teachers' associations and the association of inspectors, as well as by higher educational institutions who deal with blacks such as technikons, universities and training colleges.

The minister nominates five members only. This is aimed at gaining representation from broad sectors of the community such as business, the churches, cultural organisations and organised labour, where it would have been difficult to establish channels of nomination.

[LEADERSHIP] The scope of representation seems to be unusually wide. What are you trying to achieve?

[Viljoen] We are trying to attain the widest possible input from the professional side as well as from the community. One has to keep in mind that blacks do not have access to the central political structures of the country where educational policy is determined. Until such time as reform leads to blacks sharing power in the central legislative and executive institutions, we believe this council may serve as an alternative channel.

[LEADERSHIP] So there is an explicit political component in this system?

[Viljoen] Call it a community representation component. I try very hard to posit two things in relation to education and politics. The first is, I do not believe you will achieve real stability in educational reform if you do not also progress towards really acceptable political power-sharing. Because politics and education are interdependent. Better education creates higher expectations. Better educated people insist on a greater political voice.

But they remain discrete, separate spheres. Take the slogans that emanated from the militant and radical movements, of "freedom before education": this was one of the most counter-productive and self-destructive idiocies that have ever been perpetrated by militants. In contrast, I think the black community now really accepts the standpoint I advocated from the beginning, namely "education for meaningful freedom". You cannot have democracy or freedom or political emancipation or even good administration without good education. And I think the black leadership corps and the black communities have gone for this idea very strongly.

[LEADERSHIP] It is often argued that the only practical way to achieve equal education and eliminate conflict would be to integrate education for all under one department. Did the De Lange commission not recommend this?

[Viljoen] No; the De Lange report recommended that a central, uniform educational system should be established in four respects—financing; the registration of teachers; salaries and other conditions of service; and syllabuses, examinations and qualifications. All those function have been allocated to the new Minister of National Education. He is actually an umbrella minister, controlling these four functions. And his advisory bodies are all multi-racially composed, with experts from the various population groups.

Now, opinions differ about what further De Lange recommended. Some people say the commission recommended that various educational departments should be established on a geographical basis alone. Others say no, they could also be established on the basis of population groups.

When government compiled its White Paper, we specifically asked Professor De Lange and Professor Garbers what they had meant. And they told us they had left this question open, as a matter of political choice.

Now the government's standpoint is that, in the case of state education and state schools, every population group should have its own schools. But it has also accepted that a certain flexibility has to be built in for people who want a different arrangement. For that reason, private schools have been able to determine their

own admissions for a considerable period now; and, two years ago, the government went further and made subsidies available to them, whether they are open or closed.

Also at tertiary level, as you know, institutions may determine their own admissions policy.

[LEADERSHIP] You have, however, on occasion expressed your firm support for separate education.

[Viljoen] Oh yes. That is my standpoint. But I think one of the mistakes the De Lange report pointed out is that we have over-emphasised the community-directed nature of education to the point of fragmentation, without any central, overarching policy that could ensure that standards and quality is the same for everybody. And I believe the Department of National Education under Minister De Klerk is establishing this very strongly.

[LEADERSHIP] So you believe that education should remain separate, for the foreseeable future?

[Viljoen] Yes, I do.

[LEADERSHIP] For what reasons?

[Viljoen] Well, as far as the white community is concerned, it is the wish for the voters—very strongly so, and with great conviction. But I think, if one now comes with the idea of Minister De Klerk and Minister Heunis of a more flexible definition of groups, then there may be groups who may wish to open up their education, as they may want to make their residential areas more open and more flexible. And the old approach that the same pattern must always be applied unchanged to everybody is certainly something that will receive a lot of attention in the negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation.

[LEADERSHIP] What about free settlement areas?

[Viljoen] The government's current viewpoint is that existing educational policy should also apply in the free settlement areas. However, I believe that strongly subsidised private schools will probably become the preferred model for those areas.

[LEADERSHIP] At one stage a few years ago your department held talks with the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). Later, however, your attitude towards the NECC appeared to change, and you spoke out strongly against "people's education". What led to this about-turn?

[Viljoen] We had contact with several local and regional organisation of the education crisis committee type, and in general, they provided fruitful opportunities for discussions. But when the NECC was formed we found they were totally politicised. They had a rigid, inflexible attitude, and the discussions that Deputy Minister Sam de Beer repeatedly attempted to open with them came to nothing. So we decided it was a waste of time; all these people wanted was to radicalise the schools. And in their policy statements they also adhered to the idea of ungovernability by strongly emphasising "people's education".

Now, regarding "people's education", I have often stated very clearly that, insofar as this signifies a radical, revolutionary and violent overthrow of the present system, we cannot go along with it. But "people's education" in its literal sense, namely the idea that education must be related to the people, is a very important principle that we have in fact adopted.

It forms part of our policy in two important respects. The first is that the people must be involved in the administration and the government of education, as for instance by means of the council system. And secondly, the contents of education must not be foreign to the black community. Until now, the syllabuses in black schools have been strongly white-centric. But provision is being made for black educationalists to participate in the formulation of syllabuses so that the views and interests of the black community will be adequately reflected.

[LEADERSHIP] Where does this leave you in relation to the NECC or the UDF [United Democratic Front] or other community organisations?

[Viljoen] At the moment we have very little direct contact with them. There are certain places where they are trying to bring schools to a standstill. But there is little direct interaction. And I am really heartened by the enormously strong participation in the management council elections by the broad community in the first four months of this year.

[LEADERSHIP] Do you accept that a time may come when you will have to talk to these organisations once again?

[Viljoen] We are prepared to talk to people who really want to further the interests of education.

[LEADERSHIP] You seem to feel that they don't really want to do this.

[Viljoen] Well, at the moment we have no indication that these people want to, or wanted to, do something positive regarding education. But should they come with any positive ideas or subjects for discussions, we will certainly look at it in a positive way.

[LEADERSHIP] Earlier, you linked stability in black education to the extension of political rights to blacks. Can you expand on this?

[Viljoen] The destabilisation of education by means of boycotts and other negative actions is almost always politically inspired. In other words, in the absence of normal political channels of representation, people use education to exercise pressure in order to achieve certain political ends.

This is as clear as daylight when you look at the grievances or demands customarily submitted by pupils. Perhaps one in six or eight may have something to do with education. The rest all relate to political and security issues.

For this reason it is obvious to me that the government will act not only in the interests of justice and the country in general, but also in the interests of education—especially in the black communities—if it would, within the shortest possible period, establish through negotiation a new constitutional dispensation in which blacks—or at least the majority of blacks—will feel that they have a meaningful stake and in which they can realise their aspirations.

Then they would no longer need to use education to achieve political ends; they could use political channels to achieve political ends.

[LEADERSHIP] There seems to be considerable ferment in government and the NP, among other things about the extension of political rights to blacks. What may we expect? What would you like to see?

[Viljoen] I have been very closely involved with Minister Heunis's activities. I have, throughout, been a member of the Cabinet committee appointed after the 1983 referendum to consider the inclusions of blacks in the political process. And I have consistently identified myself with that goal. Apart from my responsibilities regarding education and development aid to the self-governing territories, this is the area to which I have devoted all my time and attention. I do everything I can to further this cause.

[LEADERSHIP] It is not yet clear what form government reforms will actually take. Can you indicate what is likely to happen?

[Viljoen] The basic change in the policy of the NP that was approved by the electorate in the 1987 election was that power-sharing should not only be used as an instrument for drawing coloureds and Asians into the political process, but that this should also apply to blacks at all levels of the central national dispensation.

Initially, we said this would apply to blacks outside the self-governing territories only. But I think it is accepted today that these territories only really have autonomy over "own affairs" that are readily geographically identifiable; they also have the right and the need to have a say in questions of national importance that are dealt with by central government—just like blacks outside the homelands.

So there has been a total change in the viewpoint of the NP regarding political expression for blacks.

* Saloojee Discusses Mass Democratic Movement

34000689d Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Jun 89 pp 53-54, 56

[Interview with Cassim Saloojee, president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, by Paul Bell: "On the Threshold"; date, place not given]

[Text] In the photograph [not available] on the left, Cassim Saloojee, president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, is framed by an archway between the front door and the interior of his home in Mayfair, Johannesburg. The top of the left arch has been chipped by soft-nosed bullets, and there are several holes in the wall at the end of the passage behind him. The house was hit by small-arms fire in April 1988. The family was home but no one was hit. It was part of the price Saloojee has paid for his activism. An earlier installment was his arrest and trial for treason with 15 other leaders of the United Democratic Front [UDF] in 1985. Saloojee spent four months in prison, was released on R15,000 bail, and later acquitted. Saloojee, who is director of the Johannesburg Indian Social Welfare Association, was also founding chairman of Actstop, which has led the fight against the eviction of black people from "white" residential areas. He knows the plight of "illegals" at first hand; he has lived as one in Mayfair for 10 years.

Saloojee's experience as a former national treasurer of the UDF, as well as with the TIC [Transvaal Indian Congress] and Actstop, has given him particular insight into the ebb and flow of resistance politics and the strategies which have flowed from that. In this interview, he confirms to Paul Bell what observers have commented on over the past year, that the mood for negotiation is gradually become more favourable. But, he emphasises, the "mass democratic movement" (MDM) believes that, where it is beginning to bargain, it does so from a position of strength. For the MDM too, empowerment is the new strategy for change.

[Bell] There is a belief that the mood for negotiation is more favourable. Do you accept that, and if so, why?

[Saloojee] We would suggest that the intense resistance against repression and racially-based systems of the past few years has altered the political face of the country and propelled it into a period of genuine transition. The ideology and values of the MDM are becoming the dominant values of South African society. Even the

ruling establishment is ashamed of apartheid. The mentality of the oppressed has changed fundamentally: they can no longer be ruled the way they were in the past. That is where a new mood resides.

[Bell] The MDM still supports comprehensive, mandatory sanctions and total disinvestment. But when they happen piecemeal, the MDM and affiliated unions are unhappy. Within these two poles, there seems to be a shift in attitude to sanctions and disinvestment. Can you explain this?

[Saloojee] The shift is this, that we know from the past record of Western nations that it is unrealistic to expect them to go for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions. Therefore, as an alternative, the MDM is talking instead of strategic sanctions and trying to identify areas where there is a realistic chance of persuading certain countries to go for sanctions. There is new thinking, people are reassessing sanctions, but they are not abandoning the notion that sanctions are one way of applying pressure for change.

[Bell] So, as the ANC [African National Congress] will not lay down the armed struggle, so the MDM will not lay down the weapon of sanctions. But surely the likelihood that either strategy will succeed is very poor?

[Saloojee] The MDM inside the country does not pursue or encourage an armed struggle. But we believe we will arrive at the point of serious negotiation only as a result of the cumulative effect of a whole number of thrusts of resistance. For the MDM internally this would mean the kind of action we engaged in before the state of emergency, when we were able to mobilise people on a large scale—rent boycotts, consumer boycotts, hunger strikes, industrial action and so on.

The MDM does not rule out negotiations, but they must on the basis of certain definite conditions, including lifting the emergency, removing security forces from the townships, legalising banned organisations, repealing security legislation, releasing Mandela and the political prisoners, allowing the exiles to return.

Government would have to signal in a very dramatic way that it is serious about negotiation. But if the Minister of Law and Order simply characterises the UDF [United Democratic Front] and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] as agents of the ANC/SACP [African National Congress/South African Communist Party] alliance, or pretends the ANC has no significant support, then we do not have that possibility of negotiation.

[Question] Since the measures against the UDF and Cosatu in February 1988, those organisations have been, perforce, relatively quiescent. The pressures on government of 1984-86 came right off last year. Were the UDF and Cosatu not forced to re-evaluate the mass mobilisation strategy because it had been crushed?

[Saloojee] Government's tactic was to destroy these organisations, to immobilise their leadership, to smash activism, in order to clear the ground for its own solutions. We would be foolish to deny we have sustained damage; that would be politically dishonest. But government has not succeeded in destroying the MDM. This is suggested by a number of things. Take the hunger strike, where activists were prepared to die. It evoked a great response in the country, and there were signals from the international community that government dare not allow hunger strikers to die.

Some people suggest the MDM has been critically damaged, or that there is an equilibrium at present in which neither side can do much. We say that, to some extent, the initiative is still with the MDM, in that government can no longer decide alone in which direction the country should go, and there can be no solution without the effective participation of the MDM. We also sense deep division within the ruling establishment; that it has no clear direction or vision.

[Bell] The MDM's participation in the conference which led to the formation of the Consultative Business Movement and the MDM's entry into negotiations on the Soweto rent crisis appear to be examples of a level of engaged by the MDM that didn't exist before.

[Saloojee] Absolutely right. Until recently, business pretended it had no clout. We think it made this pretence because it lived very comfortably with apartheid. Now it has dawned on business that the economic crisis emerges directly from black resistance, and that normal economic development and growth will not be possible until all the people participate fully in the political system.

[Bell] But does your analysis permit the possibility that negotiation has also arisen out of a realisation by both sides that they have been bashing heads for too long to little purpose? Unions have been under pressure economically and politically, as has business. Surely both sides perceive pressures on them? I can't just be one side, business, throwing in the towel.

[Saloojee] The MDM hasn't simply tried an approach which failed. Despite the repression of recent years, we have made genuine advances. The transition, while it could be protracted, is deep and real. In the old days, "freedom in our lifetime" was just an ideal. Now we know it is inevitable, although how soon depends to a large extent on government.

Consider our contacts with the Democratic Party [DP]: they were based on the recognition that a significant number of whites are becoming disenchanted with traditional white politics, that a new way must be found towards a common destiny. If the MDM is a non-racial democratic movement, then its task is to gather their support. So there was a real interaction with those who took the first initiatives to form the DP.

Young Afrikaners have no tradition of extra-parliamentary politics; they understand the politics of elections and participation in a parliamentary context. To win the middle ground, one must be sensitive to the needs of this group. To expect them to take a great leap straight into the extra-parliamentary movement is totally unrealistic. We accepted that, while fundamental change could not arise within the present parliamentary system, important issues could nevertheless be raised by a movement such as the DP in the House of Assembly, where power really resides.

But parallel to that, and most important, should be its reaching out to the MDM. In recent weeks, however, the DP has been evolving in a way which causes us very serious discomfort. There might be serious problems with our working with them. There was an understanding with the DP that they would not participate in the Houses of Representatives and Delegates, and that they would respect the MDM's belief that no credibility should be given to the junior partners of apartheid.

[Bell] So you were prepared to make a concession regarding the House of Assembly because that is where real power lies.

[Saloojee] We can accept DP members going in there and telling it where it really matters. The House of Representatives, however, is totally meaningless, and the House of Delegates—with what came out of the James Commission—the least said about it the better. Now elements in the DP are saying they will contest seats in all the Houses, whereas we are committed not to participate at all. If the DP comes into, say, the Indian areas, we are going to enter into conflict with them in the same way we have with other collaborating parties. They can't fight us on one level and expect sympathy from us on another.

[Bell] Is there, then, no trade-off between legitimacy and strategy—in terms of practical politics? And has the House of Representatives, for example, not been able to use a degree of constitutional leverage? Is it not important to get one's hand on that lever?

[Saloojee] The principle of boycott is not absolute, but both those Houses are meaningless and their political track record has been miserable. No democratic movement can use those Houses for democratic ends.

White liberal commentators have given more meaning to the role of the Representatives than it deserves. Allan Hendrickse makes much of the Group Areas Act. The only change so far is the so-called free settlement areas. But people, through their own resistance, established their presence in so-called white areas in their thousands. Some estimates put black penetration in these areas at more than a hundred thousand.

To destroy Crossroads meant enormous embarrassment and violence for government. So, to throw thousands of black South Africans out of Hillbrow, the heart of South Africa's largest city, is not practical. Nor can government live with a situation in which people are living in open defiance of the law. So free settlement areas are just a device to legalise an existing situation. Those two Houses did nothing to support or encourage the so-called "illegals". None of them visited Hillbrow. For us to toy with those Houses, knowing full well the hostility towards the tricameral system, is just not on.

White democratic are talking about going along with this situation, and there is a problem of how best to accommodate and mobilise the support of those who are becoming alienated from the National Party and are groping their way towards to the MDM. But the DP's position on the other Houses is going to cause enormous difficulties; its recent announcements have caused us deep disquiet.

[Bell] To return to MDM strategy, there appears to have been a shift from mass mobilisation towards a greater willingness to talk, if only because of prevailing conditions.

[Saloojee] Take the Soweto rents boycott. A few years ago, local affiliates of the MDM would simply have said: "You don't deal with the system". Now, people like Frank Chikane and Albertina Sisulu are going directly to government and trying to arrive at an accommodation. But this has been because they are in a position of strength. The boycott caused serious problems for government, and the MDM saw there was a real chance of making gains for the people. That genuinely is a shift, to that extent.

The hunger strike was also negotiation, but in a different form. There was militant action in the prisons which caused serious problems for government, and led to the release of many detainees.

[Bell] This approach coincides very strongly with the strategy now described as empowerment. Is this not a new departure for the MDM?

[Saloojee] This is where people take initiatives to take control of their destiny, whether at local or national level. In this area, we are confining our remarks to actual experience, because government is going to read much into it, and there is this whole suggestion on their part of sedition and treason and so on. But we accept that we would explore quite seriously this question of empowerment of the oppressed communities, at every level, that they must develop a sense of their own power and influence.

In this context, you don't simply sloganise, or come together in mass meetings to protest. You engage the system seriously at a whole number of levels, with the clear intention of making gains—and, in the process, developing a sense of potential power.

The MDM is beyond the phase of simply having to bring about an awareness and a consciousness that demands political rights. That we now take as given. In this transition stage, people are certain that fundamental change is inevitable. Now we have to apply our minds to how to make real gains.

Boksburg and Carletonville are classic examples: here people are becoming conscious of their buying power, and using it politically. It is not all clearly worked out, but it is a direction. We are working on strategies of black empowerment, where people can demonstrate what they can do. It is a new departure.

[Bell] Two years ago, the MDM's position was that it could not discuss the nature of a post-apartheid society because it was too busy defending itself against repression. Does the MDM believe the situation has moved beyond that, that it can now encourage greater debate on the future?

[Saloojee] I believe so. The days of apartheid are numbered. There has been a break with the past. People are talking now of developing a fuller vision of the post-apartheid society. The ANC has issued its constitutional guidelines. We say that these, and the further elaboration of the Freedom Charter, and even the South African Law Commission's suggestion for a bill of rights, or any other suggestion of bills of rights or constitutional proposals...the MDM is open to these completely! Even government accepts that the present constitution must go, and the whole constitutional question is now up for grabs. It introduces a whole new element.

This is where we say: "If you want negotiation, allow for conditions where this can happen, where people can begin freely to talk of a post-apartheid society, of the constitution, of a bill of rights." The one thing we hope quite desperately is that government won't bring the beginnings of these debates to an end. We are hoping that even the Law Commission's suggestions will be treated seriously.

There are other proposals around a bill of rights, those of the MDM, that people must be allowed to discuss seriously. The ANC is apparently willing to consider a bill of rights. All of this indicates the MDM's new confidence. The economy has real problems: government has no choice but to consider the future seriously.

[Bell] Is there any greater recognition by the MDM that minority rights may have a role to play in the politics of a post-apartheid society?

[Saloojee] We believe a just order must be based on individual rights. Minority rights just opens up for us the whole Pandora's Box of group rights. The one principle the MDM will not bend on is this: ethnically-based solutions are out. South Africa must become non-racial and democratic, but this doesn't mean it must have a single culture; it can definitely be multi-cultural. The non-racial idea is coming into its own in every sphere. Racial ideology has been smashed for good. The society at present is still essentially segregationist: the NP [National Party] is still as committed to that as the Conservative Party is, on housing and education in particular. But they are very apologetic about it and they use terminology that comes from the democratic movement.

[Bell] Looking to the shorter term and the election, views are increasingly mixed on the strength of the white right. After Boksburg it seemed they had peaked, but that may have been a mistaken perception. Might it not make strategic sense for the MDM to give some sign of encouragement to government at this time, considering that the right's showing will not fail to influence government's frame of mind on reform, whatever its shortcomings?

[Saloojee] The MDM perceives that the white right's support has peaked. Also, that the NP is hopelessly divided. Our approach involves assessing the extent to which government can be weakened and isolated, although we do not adhere to the old belief that "the worse they are, the closer we are to liberation". The question we have to address is how to harness the support of a section of the white community to genuinely democratic ends. Where the election is concerned, the MDM will address itself consistently to democratic principles. We won't consider making it easier for the NP to keep the CP out. That wouldn't even occur to us.

[Bell] So how, in practical terms, will the MDM responde to these elections?

[Saloojee] It was right in 1984, with the introduction of the tricameral system, to concentrate on the quality of the candidates, the principles of non-participation, and the rejection of racially-based systems. But momentous political and economic change has occurred in five years. This time the emphasis will not simply be, "don't vote for the tricameral system", or on shouting against collaborators. We will address ourselves to what we believe are the real problems about the future, to the empowerment of the black communities, to constitutional proposals, and we will concern ourselves with the development of a vision for the future. We don't need to rant and rave against collaborators; they have already discredited themselves.

We will be addressing the classes most tempted to collaborate, those who have fears about liberation. These include small groups in the black community with certain vested interests. They must be asked whether they want to stake their future on continued white minority rule, or whether they wish to root themselves rather in the MDM and a genuinely democratic future.

We are not promoting polarisation between black and white, but are asking people to choose whether they can be secure in a racially divided society, or whether they would prefer to work for a common society.

We are fighting to enlarge the legal space in which we are working. If we can find it, and we are able to address the masses at large, then these are the kinds of concerns that we will address.

*** Law Commission's Draft Bill of Rights Examined**
34000689a Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Jun 89 pp 25-26, 29-31

[Article by Paul Bell: "Laying Down The Law"]

[Text] As South Africans grope towards the transformation of their society, experience has taught those outside the executive and judicial arms of government to be wary of placing faith in the meaning of episodic developments from within.

Hopes have been too often disappointed. In the political sphere, there have been lost opportunities and instances of bad faith. In the judicial sphere, it has seemed to many that there were two Benches, so remarkable have been the differences in several crucial judgments in which the courts have either restrained or legitimated executive power.

It was quite possible, therefore, that when the South African Law Commission published a draft bill of rights three months ago, and after the first wave of publicity and acclaim had passed by, serious observers of the country's politics of transition would soon settle back into reservations and cynicism about the document.

The bill, set against the state of the nation and of present government policy, is so contrary a proposal that opponents to government's left might have been tempted to write it off at once as some sort of quixotic aberration.

But the draft bill's timing and origins have put it safely beyond dismissal.

The brief to the Law Commission was given in 1986, while the country was in the throes of a crisis of mobilised confrontation between government and the extra-parliamentary movements. It was executed at a time when the legitimacy of every arm of the state, including the judiciary, was under increasing attack.

But the draft bill which resulted from the Law Commission's deliberations has been delivered into an atmosphere of abatement over the past year, in which prospects for negotiation have visibly improved.

As for its origins, the commission was led by two judges of the Appellate Division (Judges G. Viljoen and H. J. O. van Heerden). Its working paper was produced by Judge P. J. J. Olivier, a member of the Free State Bench on permanent secondment to the commission. And other members included a director of the Department of Justice, the president of the Johannesburg Regional Magistrate's Court, a Pretoria attorney, and a university faculty head. An august assembly of lawyers. Moreover, the draft bill was commissioned by the Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee.

The draft bill's eligibility as a component to any broadly-accepted package of political reform is undeniable. Of more immediate significance, government's initiation of the project represents its own first step towards a bill of rights, and an inching forward of its as yet poorly defined reform programme.

But, is it any more than a small, brave kite, doomed to stick, like Charlie Brown's, in the apartheid tree?

The draft bill is also a mostly unobscured view of the necessity for a political future based on human rights and secured by common law. But to what extent does it reflect any heightened responsiveness, within the judiciary as a whole, to process beyond the law which are playing a formative role in South Africa's transition? And how far can or should the judges go beyond their traditional aloofness from activism?

The Law Commission made some findings which, at first sight, are so startling, considering their origins, that it would seem the draft bill could not escape government's instant dismissal. But a closer reading suggests the commission has left some major doors open just enough for many of government's constitutional pronouncements of intent to squeeze through. On the other hand, the draft bill is sufficiently uncompromising in other major respects as to gain considerable acknowledgement from those to government's left.

In the summary of its findings, the commission says the idea of certain fundamental human rights is present in most philosophical movements, and that "the protection of the individual's right has become a universal demand", recognised even where no formal law exists. This, says the commission, has become part of the modern international legal consciousness and of the contemporary law of nations.

South Africa's common law was rooted in the protection of human rights, a premise which still applies, says the commission. But, it comments, parliamentary sovereignty and the denial of a testing right for the courts based on fundamental human rights have severely hampered the courts' ability to defend "individual and group rights" against legislation.

The commission said it found "almost universal acceptance and insistence" among those who testified that human rights merited protection. It cited 12 reasons to provide greater protection to individual human rights, among them: meeting the requirements of the concept of the rule of law, and black expectations; satisfying the

sense of social contract between subject and ruler; strengthening the courts and creating legal certainty; and playing an important role of reconciliation in the constitutional sphere.

Article 2 sets the tone of the draft bill. It proposes "the right of human dignity and equality before the law...there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race, colour, language, sex, religion, ethnic origin, social class, birth, political or other views or any disability or other natural characteristic". It also opens the way for affirmative action on behalf of historically disadvantaged groups.

Perhaps the most vital debate within the commission was on the question of group versus individual rights. The commission says it is "necessary to distinguish between political group rights and other group values". The latter include culture, religion and language and can be protected by a bill of rights. But political group rights should be protected, says the commission, "the rest of the constitution".

Cultural, religious and linguistic values cannot, says the commission, be protected as group rights because groups are not a legal persona. That, extrapolated in the context of existing legislation, would mean the Group Areas Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and so on, would have to go. But a bill of rights, according to the commission, could protect cultural and other values nevertheless by giving the courts power to decide where the rights inherent in those values had been reduced by legislation or executive action.

Furthermore, Articles 16 and 17 of the draft bill propose the right of individuals to associate or disassociate from other individuals or groups.

All this, read in conjunction with the commission's assertion that the statute book must be purged of all legislation in conflict with a bill of rights, seems to indicate that, at this stage, the commission sees the possibility that racial discrimination can be removed from legislation, but that, when it comes to the constitution itself, racial or "group" distinctions may have to be maintained in the structure of the legislature.

That purge, says the commission, will have to include the present constitution, the Population Registration and Group Areas Act, prolonged detention without trial, and "other important examples of discriminatory measures". And it will have to accompany both the formulation of a bill of rights and constitutional negotiations.

While the commission's brief did not extend to constitutional proposals, it said a bill of rights would not be accepted as legitimate if blacks were not given the vote. Article 20 proposed "the right of all citizens over the age of 18 to exercise the vote on a basis of equality", but where it deals with the franchise in its preamble, it describes that vote in slightly different terms, as "equal or equivalent".

Apart from the right to make a profit (Article 14) and hold private property (Article 15), which socialists may dispute where those rights contradict their side of the debate on the redistribution of national resources, the other striking component of the draft bill is its emphasis on common law where that bears on government's powers to restrict personal liberty, and its affirmation of certain other rights which were once denied but have since been partially or wholly restored.

In the case of the latter, Article 11 concerns the right to the integrity of the family, freedom of marriage and the upholding of the institution of marriage. Consider, here, the Mixed Marriages Act and the pass laws, both now repealed. In Article 12, the pass laws are more directly recalled, as is job reservation, in the right to move freely in the Republic, to reside, work and carry on any lawful business, occupation or trade.

Article 14, on the right "freely and on an equal footing to engage in economic intercourse", would mean the scrapping of all remaining restrictions on, for example, black businesses in "white" areas.

The draft bill's provision of restrictions on the executive's powers of arrest and detention is particularly specific, and equally significant. For example, habeas corpus—the right of an arrested person to be brought before a court and charged or released within a reasonable time—would be elevated beyond the Criminal Procedure Act and entrenched within the bill of rights. It would, for example, prevent the Internal Security Act's harsher provisions for holding suspects being given a status overriding that of provisions in other statutes.

Articles 23 to 26 deal generally with the rights of a person arrested, accused or imprisoned. Article 23 would remove from the executive any discretion regarding what constitutes reasonable grounds for arrest, and place that discretion firmly in the hands of the courts.

Article 24 provides for an arrested person to be: held under conditions consonant with human dignity; told as soon as possible why he is being held; charged within 48 hours, or released; brought to trial quickly; given bail, unless the court decides otherwise; allowed to see a lawyer, and his family; and "not subjected to torture, assault or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment".

Article 25 establishes fair bases for conviction and appeal but puts the burden of proof on the state, and says nobody may be sentenced to inhuman or degrading punishment. Article 26 prescribes similarly fair treatment for prisoners.

Above all, the bill gives (in Article 31) the courts the right to test any legislative or administrative act against the bill, and to set that act aside if it exceeds the limits prescribed by the bill. And the bill's entrenchment is noteworthy: it needs only a simple majority in Parliament to add rights to the bill, but a three-quarter majority to remove them.

All told, the bill has been greeted with much enthusiasm from all sides, though some sides are more guarded than others. There is a perception among black lawyers in particular that the bill "comes from government", and therefore much reticence on their part in even discussing it. Nevertheless, where the bill deals with matters unrelated to a constitution, there would seem to be little to discuss.

Where it relates to constitutional issues, the commission places that responsibility with the politicians, but does so in a manner which suggests that, unless the politicians come up with a constitution acceptable to the broad majority of South Africans, a bill of rights will be torn up before the ink's dry.

The commissioners go further, and make it clear that this draft is only their draft; that a bill of rights cannot be unilaterally formulated. They also warn in the strongest possible terms that "to use such a bill for dishonest ends, for example, to ensure domination by one group, will irreparably damage South Africa's name; such a bill could give rise to widespread unrest and civil war".

So much for the bill's contents. But what does government think of it? Thus far, it has been able to avoid any direct comment, first because the bill has been circulated to interested parties for comment, and a final proposal will reach the Cabinet only by the end of the year.

Secondly, it remains a matter for Cabinet to decide on: the report will go back to Justice Minister Coetsee for presentation to Cabinet, and discussion there. The Cabinet is not obliged at this point to make a parliamentary response. Lawyers believe the proposal is broadly supported by Coetsee. Moreover, there is clearly little in the bill to frighten government over-much. Generally, wherever the draft bill touches on constitutional matters, there are resonances with current government soundings on a new constitution. Much of the bill's political language is couched in terms similar to government's own—"highest degree of national consensus", "no domination by one group over another", "equal or equivalent votes for blacks".

There may, of course, be a world of difference in a shade of meaning. If "equivalent votes", for example, is taken by government to mean the retention of separate voters' rolls for different groups represented int heir own legislative chambers, then debate with the left on a bill of rights could be endless. So, if anything, the bill may not present so much of a problem for government as for government's opponents to the left.

Government has long hoped it may be possible to take the "racial sting" out of laws but still guarantee white security through a constitutional formula that weighs group against group without reference to the preponderance of numbers within any group. Moreover, when the draft bill was released, government immediately held it up to the international community as a demonstration that its reform programme was on track.

Information Minister Stoffel van der Merwe tells LEADERSHIP he believes the general principle of a bill of rights is acceptable. "But I think it is advisable for the government not to take too definite a stand at too early a stage, so as not to shorten the debate or make the debate too controversial." In fact, the longer the debate, he says, the greater will benefit the cause.

Van der Merwe also makes it clear that government gladly accepts the commission's advice that blacks will have to get the vote before the country gets a bill of rights. How blacks should vote is the issue to be decided, but structuring that is itself going to take "longer than 12 months."

On the question of group versus individual rights, the minister echoes the commission: "We maintain that there are some rights which a person does not exercise in an individual capacity, but in a group context. A person may have, for instance, the right to vote but, because of the structure of that society, it is a foregone conclusion that his vote is not going to make any difference whatsoever. Not now and not in 50 years' time. In such a situation, that person's individual vote is rendered meaningless."

It is for that very reason, says Van der Merwe, that the commission has concluded that political rights must be dealt with in a constitution and not in bill of rights. The capacity of a bill of rights to protect the collective rights of a particular group is very suspect, says the minister: he maintains that the concept of individual human rights developed in homogenous Western societies protected by international boundaries.

Van der Merwe acknowledges that when government speaks of protecting group rights, it is suspected of really talking about white privilege. "We will have to show this is not so," he says, and he reiterates government's intention to re-examine its group concept with a view to certain redefinitions. The idea of an "open" group with some constitutional weight is, while not yet policy, certainly under discussion.

It seems government may arrive at a new constitutional formula for the inclusion of blacks sooner than it will repeal the Group Areas, Separate Amenities, and Population Registration acts. It is already tinkering with the first two, and Van der Merwe indicated that Population

Registration was too rigid for present circumstances. Mechanisms to suspend parts of such acts could be introduced "to allow the community to find its own balance".

But whatever government's willingness to consider a bill of rights, it has the Law Commission's advice, nay warning: "The present constitutional deadlock on the black vote will have to be resolved to the satisfaction of all if the bill of rights is to have credibility, for the simple reason that the right to vote is one of the fundamental human rights that must be enshrined in any constitution. Until that is done, the creation of a bill of rights will be suspect. The creation of a parliamentary system that will satisfy everyone is therefore a prerequisite."

There was considerable discussion in the commission on whether a bill could be introduced "immediately", "as a matter of ur[illegible]ncy" or "as the outcome of negotiations". The commission opted for the latter, even though there were strong submissions for a limited bill by liberal academic lawyers, among them Prof John Dugard of Applied Legal Studies at Wits and Hugh Corder, Professor of Public Law at the University of Cape Town.

Says Corder: "We felt, in the middle of 1986, that the chances of a full-scale bill being accepted were virtually nil. So we decided to set our sights a bit lower, and build from there." They have since accepted the commission's preferred course. "The political atmosphere has changed. I would certainly suggest now that you go for the full measure and let the debate develop. Anything less would be utterly illegitimate in the eyes of the vast majority."

But Corder never imagined the commission would go as far as it did, which was why he had backed a limited bill in the first place. "I certainly know I didn't expect this report to come from where it has come. I didn't think it was possible and therefore it was a strategic argument at the time."

In fact, the draft bill has given those outside the executive and judicial establishments cause to consider afresh the political mind-set of judges—a perilous land where explorers tread with great lightness of foot.

Liberal lawyers, while mindful of their own injunction not to be tempted by individual judgments into over-optimism about the mood of the Bench, could not conceal their pleasure at the more recent pronouncement of Judge P. J. van der Walt when he acquitted trade unionist Moses Mayekiso and four others charged with treason.

While Van der Walt acquitted the five on the grounds of insufficient evidence, he noted in his judgement that "treason is a crime in a very special category where the ideas and political aspirations of those charged are part of the issue". Given the country's spectrum of politics, the wide legitimacy of aspirations and grievances, the extravagant political language used, and the fact that most citizens involved in this way were "striving for a just South Africa", a charge of treason should be very carefully considered before being brought.

Lawyers know too well the dangers of trying to tell a judge what is in his ind, but the Mayekiso judgment seemed, to all intents and purposes, to offer a redefinition of treason more in keeping with present political realities, whatever government's view might be.

Geoff Budlender of the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg prefaces his observations by recalling the phenomenon which lawyers have observed in the judiciary over the past 10 years.

"On apartheid issues, the courts seemed very much more open to accepting that their job was to control abuses of power by officials. Examples were the Komani and Rikhoto judgments on the application of the pass laws, the judgement on the Mogopa removal, or that on government's attempt to incorporate Moutse into KwaNdebele.

"On security issues, there was not the same openness. The courts adopted a hands-off approach, as if to say that state officials knew better than the courts on matters relevant to security. During the state of emergency, in which the State President has exercised vast powers given to him by the Public Safety Act, and has himself given vast powers to every member of the so-called security forces, the courts have seldom been willing to investigate the exercise of those powers.

"Nevertheless, the commission's draft bill may be a better indication of the mood of the judiciary than episodic judgments. One hopes that it reflects a broader consensus within the judiciary as to what the role of the courts should be."

Dennis Davis, Associate Professor of Commercial Law at UCT [University of Cape Town], reminds that the judiciary inherited the notion of parliamentary sovereignty and acts accordingly. But, he believes, there have been cautious changes. "Judges are beginning to break out of the total onslaught discourse which for so long has dominated the government's response to extra-parliamentary developments. But the Law Commission's bill may have changed the scenario more substantially."

A black advocate, who has paid harsh penalties for political activity in his younger days, but who may not be named for professional reasons, says the draft bill and the Mayekiso judgment are "the closest yet to what should be seen to be coming from the judiciary". They reveal, he says, "a greater sensitivity and responsiveness" within the judiciary "to factors which will have an important formative role in our history.

"The commission and Judge Van der Walt have separately taken into account the broader reality of South Africa. A lot has already been done, from the grotesque to the sublime, to indicate what that reality is, and the judiciary has not been unaffected. I hope the shift is real. I hope two swallows make a summer."

Edwin Cameron of Applied Legal Studies at Wits believes the last five to six years have seen judges become more aware of their political role, and of the legitimacy of subjecting them to criticism. He describes it as "a loosening of institutional rigidity" and says it would be naive to think that any arm of the state could have remained immune to the questions of legitimacy that have been raised so vehemently in this period, however much the judges initially resented being brought into the debate.

"The legitimacy crisis is growing. Judicial awareness of that crisis is growing. If there is a new mood in the judiciary, and it would seem there is, then that must grow too.

"The draft bill was a surprise. The commission skillfully rearranged government's agenda. The Minister of Justice asked them to look at group rights, but they went further. The report is most impressive; it is a scholarly, exhaustive document and one must salute its integrity. Also surprising was the profundity of its political approach in that it took account of national debate, examining even the Freedom Charter, on the country's future."

Hugh Corder, when he expresses his own surprise at the draft bill "coming from where it came", is not alone. Other lawyers refer to the perceived atmosphere of Bloemfontein, home of the Appellate Division, relatively unaffected by the outward signs of the national crisis, bound by the atmospherics of a time out of time.

Corder himself recalls being sharply attacked when he submitted his proposals on a bill of rights three years ago. But, when he looks for evidence of shifting judicial attitudes, he notes how much the response from those quarters to what he said in 1986 has since changed.

Clearly, an increasing number of judges are gradually but very delicately lowering a judicial ear to the political ground. The trick, of course, is not to get off the Bench in doing so.

"An essential element of the judicial function," says Corder, "is that you will get a fair hearing. Judges are very mindful that if they step too much into the arena, that essential element, that expectation of a fair hearing, may be harmed. When I argue that the judiciary should take a more active role, should act almost as upper guardians of those who have no parliamentary representation, and try to curtail parliamentary sovereignty, I know that it is an extremely controversial argument. It is a moral argument; I have no legal grounds for it. But if judges don't step into the arena, they are doomed as a group. It poses a great danger—now and in the future—to the whole notion of an independent checking force able to control the executive and legislature."

Corder probably goes well beyond what the judges are prepared publicly to contemplate. Privately, however, there have been other developments. Judges have retired to work more actively in more overtly political fields of law. A former Appeal Court judge now does consulting work with Legal Resources in Pretoria. Former judge Laurie Ackermann is now Professor of Human Rights at Stellenbosch.

Informal networks of exchange between judges and the broader legal fraternity are spreading wider. For example, seminars are now held on a fairly regular basis, at which judges and academic and professional lawyers discuss major contemporary issues. These are off-the-record, no-holds-barred sessions in which the judges have been willing to accept sharp criticism, and given as good as they got, in an uncommon spirit of frankness and openmindedness.

No one would dare to speculate on what impact such seminars may have made on subsequent judicial attitudes, but the implication is there. These judges, or some of them, are searching for ways in which they can smooth their society's passage to freedom without compromising the essence of their judicial responsibility.

They remain, the lawyers believe, a minority for the present. From some harsher critics of the judiciary comes this stormy observation which indicates the more extreme view held of the majority of judges: "We have been shocked at the lack of political sense of the judges, at their protection, at their mollycoddled perceptions which do not extend to any understanding of what makes people tick in a block opposition."

Edmund Burke wrote in 1777: "People crushed by laws have no hopes but from power. If laws are their enemies, they will be enemies to laws..." He might well have added: "...and to those that must apply them." South African judges will face such criticism, fairly or unfairly, for as long as there are laws which are regarded as unjust. It is, as Corder points out, essentially an argument about where the intention and motivation of those who stand accused in political trials should best intersection to serve the interests of justice.

A broadly accepted bill of rights would shorten that debate drastically. The draft bill's most immediately contribution to the political climate is that it has enhanced the reputation of the judiciary.

But when the longer-term prospects for the Law Commission's draft bill are assessed, one comes down to what has become almost a political cliche. It will go into the pot to stew with the constitutional debate. Its greatest danger is also that presented to the next constitution, that it will come out half-cooked. The broadening of

South African democracy remains, in government's hands, a process of co-option. A bill of rights may be assembled in the same way, bit by little bit, part and parcel of the progress towards a properly negotiated constitution.

Because both will turn on the same axis, the enduring issue of the black vote.

*** Challenges of Urbanization Examined**
34000689c Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Jun 89 pp 91, 94-96

[Article by Wessel Ebersohn: "High Societies"]

[Text] On a 104ha strip of land in Soweto, most of it marsh, the most ambitious attempt yet to solve South Africa's black housing problem is taking shape.

In Klipspruit, south of Orlando West, eight 20-storey towers, each containing 1,000 apartments surrounded by lawns and gardens, are due to rise around a commercial centre. Adjoining the complex—known as Nancefield Centre—will be two office blocks, 24 schools, a 20,000-seat sports stadium, a hotel, and a spread of soccer fields and tennis courts. It will be, in the words of the designers, "a total environment".

For consultants Hannes Meiring, architect, and Poen Burger, quantity surveyor, the project is a dream, a vision even, but it is not an unblemished one. Elsewhere in the world, high-rise complexes have spawned social deviations and, in the case of the infamous Pruett-Igoe development in the United States, moving in the demolition experts was the final solution.

Meiring and Burger talk about the complex—to cost at least R560m at current prices—in almost evangelical terms. They tell you that black South Africans are picking themselves up off the floor and that many can now afford something better than they had in the past, that total planning is being employed, that their blueprint includes nursery schools, play parks, banks, cinemas, laundries, commercial opportunities to employ a fifth of the residents, and facilities for the information sector.

The idea originated in the mind of Dr Marquard de Villiers, head of Lonrho's property division in this country, who was impressed by what he saw as the success of high-rise living in Hong Kong. In late 1985, he took Meiring and Burger on a study tour of that and other Eastern cities, and soon after their return the three were instrumental in the founding of a not-for-gain company which they styled the Foundation for Community Development in South Africa. According to De Villiers, its purpose was to promote the concept of high-rise living in the townships.

At this point, events took an interesting turn. All three withdrew from the foundation to free themselves to take part in the project professionally. The foundation, as it is presently constituted, is something of a phantom—it has no offices and meets at the premises of Multifin, Burger's company, which also supplies it with the budget it needs. It functions under the honorary executive chairmanship of Dominee Johan Symington, better known for his appearances on a Sunday evening Bible study programme on TV1.

As for finance, the planners claim negotiations are at an advanced stage, but decline to identify the backers. The project will be totally funded by private enterprise, they say, with no government finance involved. Burger says any profits from the development have to be ploughed back into it or other projects by the foundation. Consultants will be paid according to the normal scale of fees—about 6 percent for the architect and 2 percent for the quantity surveyor.

Meiring and Burger are not unaware of the difficulties of high-rise living in many parts of the world. "People have asked us," Burger says, "why we do not start with just two towers. We say this will be looking for trouble. We have to create a complete city. it has to be top-quality from day one. People must be able to identify with it." It is an argument weakened by the fact that they plan another complex in Alexandra that, while it does include a commercial centre, cannot be presented as anything like a "total environment".

There is no disputing this group's connections. The planning map hanging on the wall of the Transvaal Provincial Administration's advisor on Alexandra already shows the space allocated to that project. It would appear that the Nancefield Centre is only one in a projected series that might be appearing soon in townships across the country. Meiring and Burger say, however, they have only made a presentation on the Alexandra complex, and that the plan has gone no further.

"We are well aware of the problems and mythology surrounding high-rise living," Meiring adds. Problems there certainly are, and a great deal more than mythology. By far the best-known high-rise disaster is the 1950s Pruett-Igoe development in St Louis, Missouri. Thirty-three buildings containing 2,800 apartments were erected with public funds to rent to the city's middle- to lower-income groups. They, too, were surrounded by gardens that were intended to provide space for children to play. The middle-income group that was to provide a stabilising influence took one look and sought accommodation elsewhere.

From the start, teenage gangs robbed and terrorised people in passages and lifts, the buildings were vandalised, and residents found themselves running a gauntlet whenever they came home or went out. The situation

was so bad that, despite expensive attempts to revitalise the complex, some of the buildings were demolished less than 10 years after construction.

A study of the problems of flat-dwellers in North Beach, Durban—one of the country's more select high-rise areas—found that many people sent their children to board at schools to get them away from the drug culture that always seems to thrive in such places. No more graphic account of the horrors of high-rise accommodation exists than in the book *H*, an account of heroin addiction among Berlin teenagers.

Christiane, on whose recollections the book was based, lived in Gropiusstadt, an estate housing 45,000 people, with lawns between the buildings and adjacent shopping centres. The passages, lifts and playgrounds stank, the grassy open areas were soon paved because of overusage, and notices went up telling kids what times they were allowed to use the play park, that no competitive ball games were allowed, that they were only allowed to be there with a parent or guardian, and so on. It was an environment designed to promote precocious sex and drug-taking, and it was utterly successful on both counts.

Meiring and Burger, on their visits to the East, found buildings in Taipei where every flat was in shadow all day, some in Hong Kong that were six storeys high without lifts, and others so close together that the view from every window was of the plainest concrete surface, or at best, the bedroom of a neighbour in the next block. They believe that Hong Kong, a high-rise city with less crime than New York (a questionable distinction) and where buildings are not vandalised as a rule, has learnt its lessons from its own poor planning of the past.

They, in turn, have learnt from Hong Kong. Today, its newer and better developments give inhabitants a view of the harbour, a curve of coastline or perhaps the broken hills along the back of the city. Buildings have communal gardens or socialising areas, large windows and wider passages. In the nature of things, they are all close to the city's amenities. For many planners, it is Hong Kong with its density of 2,400 people/ha that gives the lie to the notion that human beings cannot live contentedly in high-rise accommodation.

American researcher R. E. Mitchell, in a superbly detailed study of Hong Kong housing, found no relationship between pathology and density whatsoever. In a 1974 article, he argued that high-rise housing has been blamed sometimes for social ills that would have existed anyway. He pointed to the fact that in the disastrous Cabrini-Green development in Chicago, 70 percent of the population was under the age of 18 and half the families were without a male parent in residence.

The legitimacy of imposing solutions inspired by Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan on the South African situation has to be questioned. Nowhere is land limitless, but the South African reality is entirely different to that of those greatly overcrowded islands. Charl Schutte, senior research officer in conflict analysis at the Human Sciences Research Council, who made a study of Schubart Park—a sub-economic high-rise building for whites in central Pretoria—believes that it is not only physical density that is important. "The residents' perception and experience are as important as the number of people in a given area."

The phenomenon of overcrowding certainly lies close to the heart of the matter. Soweto is hopelessly too small for its 1,5-3m inhabitants and the injection of 8,000 new homes must help to lift the pressure on existing accommodation. But it will not remove it. The complex will have to function in an overcrowded township and many of the residents will, of necessity, seek to overfill their apartments. The two-child family that can only afford a bed-sitter will take it if they are desperate enough.

The most famous attempt to demonstrate the effects of crowding is probably John Calhoun's 1962 experiment at Washington's National Institute of Mental Health. Four interconnecting pens each had 12 large rats placed in them—large enough accommodation under normal conditions. As the population grew, dominant males took up positions at the entrances to the two outer pens, preventing excessive crowding in their domains and ensuring relative calm and stability. The two inner pens became progressively more crowded and degenerated into what Calhoun described as "a behavioural sink". Aberrant sexual behaviour, unprovoked aggression, cannibalism and the rat equivalent of gang warfare were all commonplace.

Of course, Calhoun's experiment was not conducted on human beings and differences between homo sapiens and rats are normally fairly easy to spot. But it behoves white South Africans to consider the results carefully. Those who are quick to talk about township promiscuity, unprovoked street violence, necklacing and gang warfare would do well to consider that the milling, overcrowded townships come close to approximating Calhoun's inner pens while quite, pleasant, guarded suburbia has much in common with the outer pens. As with Calhoun's dominant rats, whites have taken for themselves not only the best space, but most of it too.

And here, perhaps, lies the most serious difficulty the developers have to face. Somehow they will have to prevent the complex being associated in the minds of average Sowetans with the Group Areas Act. There are questions which will inevitably arise: Why do we need this? Why not just give us more space? Is this foundation a front for government, to squeeze more of us into the township? Why not just take away the act and build the thing in Crown Mines?

There is no word in the English language more loaded with treacherous connotations for the organisation trying to initiate any project in this country's black townships than "mandate". Black South Africans will

not be pushed and have their decisions made for them indefinitely. The shifting sands of the many political factions of a place like Soweto are no place for the uninitiated. To have the approval of the local town council, which lacks popular support, does not begin to address the problem.

Schutte talks about a home as "a defensible space". "A defence or wall is not necessarily a useful territorial boundary. The attitude of the community in which you live is far more important. An accepting community gives the individual a far safer territory than a security fence around an unacceptable space." Gerald Gordon, a senior lecturer in architecture at Wits who is currently involved in the construction of buildings for Nicro in Soweto, was taken by some of his black associates to an old West Rand Administration Board training workshop that had been vandalised during the 1976 student uprising. The windows were broken, the walls were covered with grafitti and many fittings were damaged, but the building was essentially sound. "Why do we need a new building?" Gordon asked. "Let's see if we can use this one."

Apart from a few frosty looks, his question went unanswered. Associations with the past were too powerful to allow the use of Wrab's old building. "We had not gone far," Gordon says, "before we realised that putting one foot wrong would place us in some foreign ideological camp. Now we sample opinions and keep everything as low-key as possible. Flamboyance is unwise. Any big development tends to inherit the questionable patronage that all socialised projects have for the black man. The big, powerful and rich are often seen as the enemy. There is also a profound mistrust of capital."

In the foundation's PR memoranda, much is made of terms such as "family cohesiveness, stable environment and community development", but it is precisely in the area of the family that experts find Nancefield Centre unacceptable.

It is common cause among students of high-rise living that single and childless adults cope best. If the residents are average Soweto families and extended families, it is hard to imagine how they will be able to avoid the kind of problems experienced by the Gropiusstadt residents. Dr Janet Mills, a University of South Africa sociologist, warns: "There is nothing harmful in a project of this sort, provided that you match the right people to a dwelling. How does a woman with three kids manage in a tiny flat on the 20th floor? If they could barely afford the flat, but took it out of desperation and there is no money for nursery schools or even toys..."

Burger makes the point that the flats will be looking down on the gardens and community centre. "Mothers will be able to see their children," he says. "Twenty floors is not that high." But Schutte says that the number of floors is not important. "People with small children rarely choose to live more than one floor above the ground once they have experienced those conditions."

The planners referred me to Dr Toni Lamont, a Pretoria town planning and sociology consultant, Ken Finlayson, a building technologist for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and Daan Roelvert, executive director of the Institute for Housing of Southern Africa, as experts who were in favour of their project. None proved to be more than cautiously optimistic.

Lamont and Finlayson agree with Mills that this will be no place for children. Lamont sees young professionals, semi-professionals and middle-aged couples without children as being the correct target market. The elderly, he says, also prefer to avoid high buildings. Finlayson supports this position, adding: "Especially in a developing country, I would be reluctant to place families in this sort of accommodation. Severe problems of acclimatisation and adjustment normally occur." On the positive side, Lamont believes that a dispirited, purposeless Soweto would find a much-needed stimulus in the job-creation prospects.

According to Roelvert, the project should be approached with the greatest caution. "No one can be sure of its ultimate success, but three important factors are in its favour: job opportunities, recreation possibilities for wealthier Sowetans, and easy access to important rail and road junctions."

Another favourable factor is that the apartments will be sold on sectional title. At today's prices, they will cost about R15,000 for a 24m^2 bedsitter and R56,000 for an 80m^2 three-bedroom flat. If anything protects the buildings of this development, it will be pride of ownership. In none of the high-rise disasters elsewhere have apartments been owned by the occupants.

Curiously, all this is taking place while the Sectional Title Act does not provide for black ownership. The deputy engineer of Soweto, Archer Davis, assures us that even this "is in hand". given the obvious connections of the developers, this can probably be accepted as being so. Also in its favour, if implemented, is the developers' plan for residents of each floor to belong to a committee. The floor committee would, in turn, be represented on a building committee and this would have a seat on the body corporate.

Relatively wealthy families adjust to high-rise living more easily than poorer ones. This is partly because they can afford more attractive and spacious apartments and partly because they have the resources to escape their urban environment for holidays, weekends and Sundays in the country. Mills explains: "For the survival-level family caught up in high-rise living, there can be no money for recreation of any sort. Their problems revolve

round where to hang their washing, how to keep their teenage children off drugs, and how to stay sane while cooped up in a flat with the smallest members of the family."

It is undeniable that the commercial centre will be of great value to Soweto, allowing people to spend their money in the township and contributing to genuine growth in the black community. It could be seen as part of a normalisation process, helping to change Soweto from a dormitory into a city. Nor can one dispute the tremendous job-creation prospects, both while the project is under construction and afterwards. But none of it will have meaning if mothers with babies find themselves prisoners in tiny apartments and the project degenerates into something approximating Calhoun's "behavioural sink".

Even Mitchell, high-rise housing's brilliant proponent, recognises that "unrelated families in dwelling units on a higher floor in a multi-storey building tend to suffer somewhat higher levels of potentially serious emotional strain. They are especially likely to manifest high levels of hostility". Apply this to a township in which, according to Aggrey Klaaste, editor of THE SOWETAN, "mindless violence is the rule", and you have a doubtful recipe for social fulfillment.

The Soweto Town Council is more than keen on the project. Deputy engineer Davis concedes that the R50,000/ha being charged for the land is "pretty cheap". But then, he says, it's not easy getting developers interested in black areas. He points to the influx into Hillbrow and central Johannesburg as a sign of black acceptance, but fails to draw any distinction between acceptance and desperation. The chairman of the council's executive committee, Payne Tshabalala, does not foresee any serious problems as far as traditional customs are concerned "because everybody moving to and buying properties in the high-rise buildings will do so out of their own choice. The developers have listened to our comments on cultural occasions and have made provision for them in the design where possible".

Commercial viability rests essentially on demand. But no direct marketing has been done yet and the community has not been consulted in any great depth. According to the developers, the numbers are there. Some 32,000 buyers, approved in terms of income, occupy the council's waiting list alone. How many of them fall into the category of childless professionals and semi-professionals recommended by Lamont and Finlayson is another matter entirely.

"I recommend high-rise experimentation," Finlayson says. "Greater living density for all city dwellers is going to be unavoidable in future. But a major difficulty with this proposal is that the developers want a minimum commitment of R560m and 8,000 households to prove their hypothesis.

"Most contented high-rise residents the world over have chosen this over other models. In Soweto this sort of choice will not be possible. When high-rise works, it works for specific reasons. We do not know whether these reasons exist in Soweto at the present time."

At best, Nancefield Centre is a gamble, but those taking the chances with their lives and limited financial resources will be the residents themselves. If Burger and Meiring get their way, let's hope their gamble pays off. It is going to be an expensive roll of the dice if it comes up snake-eyes.

Angola

UNITA Terms Reports on Savimbi 'Inaccurate'

MB1108055789 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2256 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Johannesburg Aug 10 SAPA—A senior spokesman for UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in Angola says reports claiming that the leader of the movement, Dr Jonas Savimbi, has criticised President Mobutu of Zaire--calling him a political opportunist—are inaccurate.

Speaking in an interview with the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], UNITA's chief representative in the United States, Mr Jardo Muecalia, said the criticism had been directed at the attitude of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government in Angola.

He said the MPLA was trying to present the Gbadolite agreement and declaration as one which envisaged the exile of Dr Savimbi and the integration of UNITA into the MPLA. Mr Muecalia said no such agreements had been reached and that the matter had not even been discussed.

Meanwhile peace talks in Zaire between the Angolan Government and UNITA have again been suspended with Angola saying the UNITA delegation does not have the authority to negotiate.

However, government sources say that they believe both sides will meet again soon.

Government Denies Launching New Offensive

MB1008130589 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1200 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Angola's Defense Ministry yesterday categorically denied UNITA's [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] allegations that FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] recently launched a general offensive against its forces in Bie, Moxico, Cuando Cubango, and Cunene Provinces.

An authorized military source told ANGOP that such claims are designed only to justify the unprecedented increase in UNITA's armed actions which are in flagrant violation of the cease-fire (?reached) in Gbadolite on (?24 June) [words indistinct] in line with the UNITA leader's guidelines whereby the march is toward Luanda and the target is also Luanda.

The same source said that between 2 and 8 August, UNITA carried out 20 attacks, 14 ambushes, 10 shellings, and planted 10 antipersonnel mines, thereby causing the deaths of 70 people and wounding 142, while 40 people are missing. These armed actions occurred in almost all of Angola's provinces, except for Cabinda, Bengo, Luanda, [name indistinct], and Lunda Norte.

According to the same source, FAPLA has been adhering to the cease-fire, reacting only when under UNITA attack. With its attacks, UNITA intends to take advantage of the low profile our forces have been adopting and thereby gain ground and negotiate from a position of strength.

The FAPLA forces' low profile comes within the framework of preventive and punitive actions that they carry out against armed groups who have attacked districts and villages, such as Lumbela and Chitembo, in violation of the cease-fire.

The same source added that UNITA's claims about an alleged general offensive are false and cannot be proved. They are designed to disturb or paralyze the Kinshasa contacts in order to prevent any perceptible results. The contacts are being held under Zaire's mediation, and they come within the framework of the commission for the integration of UNITA elements.

MPLA Fails To Attend Peace Talks Sessions

MB1108060689 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0500 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] The delegation of our glorious movement to the peace talks in the Republic of Zaire is resolutely committed to the real principles of the Gbadolite declaration on national reconciliation in Angola.

Jose Chicomo, our special envoy in Kinshasa, reports that the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party] delegation has been expressed a negative behavior during the working sessions by failing to attend them.

Meanwhile, at home, the MPLA-PT regime is waging a brutal and general military offensive, consistently resorting to large-scale air bombings. Civilian targets have been hit.

It is widely believed the MPLA-PT does not seem to be interested in peace for Angola. This view is shared by Colonel Dr Jorge Alicerces Valentim, head of our delegation to the talks. Speaking to Vorgan [Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel] in Kinshasa, Col Valentim said that the MPLA-PT is demonstrating neither a patriotic nor a responsible attitude, which is creating many difficulties. Col Valentim said it was necessary to determine the fundamental objectives of the struggle waged by the Angolan people and uphold the views for a political framework during the cease-fire talks.

It will be recalled that the delegation of our glorious movement to the third round of talks with the MPLA-PT is led by Information Minister Dr Jorge Alicerces Valentim and includes, among others, Eng Elias Salupeto Pena, Eng Joaquim Ernesto Mulato, General Peregrino

Wabu Chindondo, Gen Demostenes Chilingutila, Dr Almerindo Jaka Jamba, Brigadier Eugenio Ngolo, Colonel Adalberto Neto Epalanga, and Col Silas Mununggue.

MPLA Cease-Fire Violations Continue

MB1108063489 (Clande ine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0500 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] The MPLA-PT installed in Luanda continues to violate the cease-fire as part of its general offensive in the country.

A communique issued by FALA's [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] chief of general staff in Jamba yesterday says that two MiG-23's, flying from Lubango on 7 August, dropped three fragmentation bombs, destroying a civilian hospital near Libongue, northeast of Matala.

The communique says that at 0935 on 5 August, an enemy battalion stormed an activist group of our movement in Cambachoco, Moxico Province. Two of our soldiers were killed and three women seriously wounded.

At 1020 on 9 August, the enemy bombed our logistical position on the left bank of the Cuando River, Moxico Province.

Finally, the communique says that four Soviet-made MiG-23's, flying from Luena, strafed a position of our forces at the junction of the Camba and Lungwebungu Rivers, south of Munhango. Two people were killed and six wounded. The raid took place from 1115 to 1145 and 1330 to 1352 on 9 August.

Dos Santos To Meet With Mobutu 11 Aug

MB1108063089 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0400 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is scheduled to travel to Kinshasa today for talks with Mobutu Sese Seko, his Zairian counterpart, on the peace process in Angola.

The Zairian head of state has been mediating the talks between the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] to end the war in Angola.

Departs for Zaire 11 Aug

MB1108121589 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1200 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party chairman and president of the People's Republic of Angola, left Luanda for Kinshasa this morning for yet another diplomatic mission concerning the Angolan peace process.

The Angolan head of state, who attended a Frontline summit in Lusaka the day before yesterday [date as heard], will hold talks with Mobutu Sese Seko, his Zairian counterpart, on the proceedings of the commission [words indistinct] tasked with the integration of UNITA (?elements) into Angolan society.

The Angolan presidential delegation includes Foreign Affairs Minister Pedro de Castro van Dunem Loy, Justice Minister Franca Dunem, and Deputy Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura

* Climate of Skepticism Follows Gbadolite Summit

34420112c Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 8 Jul 89 p 16

[Article by Santos Pereira: "Political Stalemates Holding Up Peace"]

[Text] Alleged violations of the cease-fire proclaimed on 24 June by both Jonas Savimbi's forces and the commando units of the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola], a flood of confused and often contradictory statements, and an active round of diplomatic maneuvers are keeping the capital of Angola in an atmosphere of confusion, doubt, and perplexity concerning the domestic pacification process which began on 22 June with the handshake between Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, and the now celebrated Gbadolite Declaration.

"Excuse me, but I prefer not to discuss this, as it is all still too fresh." "No, don't print my name—it is all still too sensitive for any statement at this time." "Look, to be honest, I do not understand anything of what is happening, and I don't believe anyone does." These are the comments one hears repeatedly in Luanda when one asks for opinions on the peace process. These statements clearly reflect the prevailing uncertainty, even in circles close to the government, about the real dimensions of the agreements negotiated in Mobutu's luxurious mansion in Gbadolite.

"No one in Luanda can be reached at this time, because everyone is always in a meeting." This is a comment frequently heard in diplomatic and enterprise circles in the capital.

The secrecy, frequently breached by confused and contradictory "leaks," about some of the aspects negotiated in Gbadolite, in particular the crucial issue of Jonas Savimbi's fate, and the dense web of maneuvers surrounding the agreement give the impression that the real importance of this summit meeting is only now being established, in the course of a real battle for position and a war of influence.

Accusations From Luanda

The confused echoes of Gbadolite had barely begun to fade when a series of unexpected rumors began to complicate the situation. On 29 June, the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] was accused on a television newscast from Luanda of having violated the cease-fire proclaimed 5 days earlier. Savimbi's forces were charged with the responsibility for sabotaging the high-tension lines supplying Luanda (the capital was without electrical power for several days) and for the ambushes and attacks which occurred in Bie, Huila, Huambo, and other provinces.

Shortly afterward, rumors began to circulate in the capital to the effect that the government delegation headed by General N'Dalu (chief of the FAPLA General Staff), which had arrived in Kinshasa the preceding day to initiate negotiations on the practical implementation of the Gbadolite principles, had met with rejection and had departed in haste.

There followed several days of confusion and expectation, until an ANGOP [ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY] editorial last Sunday, quoting a statement by the Political Bureau of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], announced that negotiations had been suspended.

Speaking in Ponta Negra, in the Congo, where he had gone for a tripartite summit meeting with Gabonese President Omar Bongo and the Congolese leader Denis Sassou Nguesso, Eduardo dos Santos confirmed the following day that negotiations had been suspended and listed the conditions for the resumption of talks.

"First of all, that the truth be admitted (allegation of violations of the cease-fire, or the decisions adopted in Gbadolite concerning Savimbi's future?); second, that the violations of the cease-fire actually come to an end, so that it will be possible to establish an atmosphere favorable to integration of the UNITA personnel in Angolan society and the institutions of the RPA [People's Republic of Angola]; and third, that serious work be done."

The Angolan-Gabonese-Congolese summit meeting marked the beginning of a series of diplomatic maneuvers. In Luanda the following day, Minister of External Relations Pedro de Castro Van Dunem (Loy) initiated a series of negotiations in the other African capitals. This was also to be repeated with Savimbi, at the beginning of an African tour.

At the same time, contradictory reports about the alleged violations of the cease-fire made the confusion worse.

It is curious that even at 1300 hours on the 29th, just a few hours after the supply of energy to the capital was interrupted, the radio in Luanda attributed this incident to "a technical breakdown." It was not until the 2030 hours newscast that it was reported as having been caused by UNITA sabotage.

In Jamba, "Voice of the Black Rooster," the radio station of Jonas Savimbi's movement, denied the accusations being made in Luanda, and attributed the sabotage to uncontrolled MPLA groups operating in isolation in the bush. This was a report which, curiously enough, appeared to have some credibility with many people in Luanda.

Atmosphere of Skepticism

In Luanda, life seems to be continuing, completely unaffected by these movements. The people, feeling profound fatigue after 14 years of war, seem pleased by the prospect of peace. The war has caused great hardship, and its weight marks the life of Angolan citizens, even in the capital, every day.

"It was so good to be able to travel to other provinces again." "This way, I could go to my own farm to get corn and cassava." "Perhaps now I will be able to see my family, some of them with the MPLA, others with the UNITA, and still others who have fled God knows where." These were the responses frequently heard when we talked to people about the possibility of a cease-fire. But the dominant reaction was one of great skepticism, with the individuals questioned seeing "a step backward, for the time being," and wanting to "see before believing."

Life in Luanda continues unchanged and at a lively rate in the black markets, such as Roque Santeiro or Calemba, where the widest variety of goods can be found—from cigarettes to television sets, mattresses, motorcycles, and even German toothpaste and French cheese—in exchange for huge bundles of kwanzas. The same is the case in the traditional saloons, a kind of tavern where the customers drink kaporroto (a homemade liquor) and dance to Angolan folk tunes, and where evenings frequently end in an animated hubbub.

But the handshake between Eduardo dos Santos and Savimbi in Gbadolite, jealously kept secret until now, and only admitted publicly (and in vague terms) by the Angolan president in Ponta Negra on Monday, seems to have been a psychological shock, and continues to be a hard mouthful to swallow.

MPLA sources have assured us that there has been evidence of unease in the Armed Forces and in the party itself concerning the path pursued by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The MPLA and the Angolan Government itself were completely taken by surprise. The strategy pursued seems to have been an entirely personal choice on the part of the president.

According to what we were told in confidence by some military sources, the regional commanders of the FAPLA made it known in Futungo de Belas (the seat of

the Angolan Presidency) on the 25th that they applauded the cease-fire, but had not agreed to welcome the presence of UNITA officers in command positions in the Armed Forces in the future.

Observers familiar with the Angolan scene are venturing the opinion that the interruption of the talks between Luanda and the UNITA and the hardening of Eduardo dos Santos' language at the press conference held at the conclusion of the Ponta Negra summit meeting might have been maneuvers designed to gain time, to exert pressure on Savimbi, and above all, for domestic consumption, in order to moderate the resistance to any "entente" with the UNITA leader.

Confusion in Jamba

The handshake in Gbadolite seems to have led to serious indigestion on both sides. A diplomat who followed the summit meeting in Gbadolite closely assured us that Eduardo dos Santos, who had previously been extremely active, making repeated efforts to contact his Angolan counterparts, was left "silent" and "as if prostrate" after the handshake with Savimbi.

It is equally curious that contrary to his usual habit, Savimbi remained entirely incommunicado for more than 24 hours after his return to Jamba following the Gbadolite summit meeting—"resting," according to the radio station "Voice of the Black Rooster."

On the other hand, the UNITA delegation arrived at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kinshasa for the negotiations with the team from N'Dalu 24 hours late. And, contrary to expectations, it was headed not by Jorge Valentim, as had been planned, but by Demostenes Chitinguila, the chief of the General Staff of the UNITA forces. This gave rise to numerous speculations to the effect that the delay had been caused by a bitter argument in Jamba about who should head the delegation.

These points, linked with the fact that Savimbi set off just a few days later for a series of talks abroad, nurtured speculation to the effect that in Jamba as well, the Gbadolite agreement and the proposed integration of UNITA members would give rise to some resistance.

On the political level as well, everything seems to remain to be defined, in terms of the framework within which the planned integration of the members of Jonas Savimbi's movement will be carried out.

Just yesterday, Roberto de Almeida, the ideological officer of the Political Bureau of the MPLA, assured us that "we want to guarantee peace, but not at any price, so that we do not put our principles and the gains we have won at desperate cost at risk."

He further explained that "the integration of the UNITA elements is not an unconditional matter. It will be done on an individual basis, and these individuals will have to recognize the Constitution and the party. The UNITA is not going to be a complementary party."

On the other hand, according to sources in the Angolan capital, the UNITA seems determined to demand a real share of the power. It is speculated that Savimbi might demand the security, agriculture, and transport ministries (doubtless with the future of the Benguela Railroad in mind).

But beyond these issues, the problem of integration seems to pose delicate social problems.

The majority of the people in Luanda, who clearly desire peace, say that they could accept the presence of the UNITA personnel. "They are Angolans too. It would be like a sort of return of the prodigal son." And there are even those who say "whether it is with the UNITA, or whoever, let us finish with this once and for all—we are fed up."

A man crippled in an attack carried out by Savimbi's forces in Huambo, on the other hand, reacted violently when asked how he would welcome the return of the members of the UNITA. "I will welcome them with this (waving the stump of his leg) and a grenade," he burst out.

There is every indication that for many party and Armed Forces cadres, coexistence with persons of mixed blood (whom Savimbi has denied status as Angolans), and those disabled during these 14 years of war (more than 60,000, according to preliminary estimates, added to more than 100,000 dead and a million and a half homeless), would be extremely difficult.

Given this context, any development seems possible. There are those in certain FAPLA sectors who continue to insist on a plan which was discussed a number of times after the four-party agreements in New York (22 December). It called for an attack for the purpose of taking Jamba and forcing Savimbi's men out, in order to negotiate subsequently from a position of strength.

This plan appears to have been practically abandoned now, since the commitments made internationally, the logistical problems in sustaining an occupation of Jamba, and the danger of retaliation (Savimbi's men could systematically cut off Luanda's power supply, for example) make it hazardous to contemplate for now.

But if the violations of the cease-fire by the UNITA continue, possibly as a way of satisfying the malcontents, it is impossible to exclude "punitive expeditions to teach Savimbi a lesson."

Compromises Ensure Peace

For the time being, the best guarantee of the peace process in Angola still seems to be the series of international commitments in which it is already involved. The Zairian leader continues to be viewed with great mistrust in many sectors in Luanda, and diplomatic circles are beginning to note that the tripartite summit meeting at the beginning of the week might have been designed to some extent to strip Mobutu of his position as the sole overseer of the negotiations between the Angolan government and the UNITA.

For the time being, "Jose Eduardo dos Santos is in a position of strength. There is no alternative, and there is no one to oppose him, particularly since the Catete group (hard-line, and linked with the person of Agostinho Neto) was completely routed, and after Kito (the interior minister dismissed on suspicion of having created a kind of special force on his own initiative) was dealt with in May," an observer in Luanda who asked to remain anonymous confided to us. But the president may have to restrain himself, in order to reconcile domestic sensitivities.

Jonas Savimbi is also running some risks in this process. The government of the United States has now reiterated that it will not abandon the UNITA or cease to support it, but on the other hand, diplomatic sources give assurance that the South African government, which has a heavy interest in cooperation with Luanda (experts in Pretoria believe that Angola has the resources necessary to complement the South African economy), is said to be prepared to abandon Savimbi in order to reach agreement with the Angolan Government.

Also, the offer of important posts in the Angolan Government or administration might in the end prove tempting to certain elements in the UNITA, isolating Savimbi in the end.

The fate of this leader still seems to be very unclear. Kenneth Kaunda and Mussa Traore, the president of the Organization of African Unity, have already confirmed that at the Gbadolite summit meeting, Savimbi promised to agree to exile from Angolan territory for 2 years.

It is also being speculated in diplomatic circles that the government in Luanda may have given Savimbi guarantees of an "honorary status" (the possibility of a vice presidency has even been mentioned) once he returns.

Savimbi repeated once again at the press conference held in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) the day before yesterday that "by no means will I withdraw from Angola." It is believed that the UNITA leader plans to remain in Jamba.

But nothing is really known as yet, and just yesterday an individual close to the government in Luanda told us that "if Savimbi does refuse to leave, we will have to review the situation and submit the matter for consideration to the chiefs of the African states who have sponsored the peace process."

There is every indication, finally, that what happened in Gbadolite was merely a timid first step in a delicate process of negotiation, and even a guerrilla war of propaganda and bluffing, such that the great battle has yet to begin.

*** MUDAR's Role in Peace Process Analyzed**
34420112d Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese
8 Jul 89 p 30

[Article by Carlos da Matta: "Angola Moves Slowly Toward Peace"]

[Text] The first violations of the cease-fire have not been clearly explained, but there is every indication that this situation is in the process of being overcome. It is not known if the reason is an effort to exert pressure, or slippage, or ignorance. The UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] sought to minimize the importance of the matter, and the government sent messages to the heads of the neighboring states to explain its version of the events. The dynamics remain, despite the extremists on both sides, with each of these groups believing that it can obtain more.

The scenario drafted by the chiefs of state who met in Gbadolite called for the integration of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and the UNITA in the various state structures, without devoting any consideration to the party issue. They seem to believe that it will resolve itself on the basis of the balance of forces at the moment, which does not exclude possible recourse to arms based on a need for a rapid decision. Later on.

Some African observers say that beyond the personal differences and the hatred which has been created on certain levels, the two governments do not have ideologies which are incompatible, and at the present time, they do not even have incompatible foreign alliances.

The most attentive observers in Angola, however, know how difficult it will be to overcome the mistrust existing between the two apparatuses, or even to what extent it is likely that the differences within each of the two political-military organizations will be aggravated. All that is needed is for one of them to develop the feeling that it has made excessive concessions.

The risks, moreover, are immense, but so is the potential. Coexistence, whether calm or agitated, and the surfacing of the differences we all know have existed "underground," make a new relationship between those who bear arms and society necessary.

The urgent need to seek support and to demonstrate better work than the other faction opens up antiobscurantist space, provided that the more enlightened sectors are prepared to wage a struggle to achieve this end.

Among the independent democrats, members of what is now called MUDAR [expansion unknown], which despite all its inadequacies merits credit for having raised the issue of human rights and legitimacy of expression for those who oppose the war, there appears to be unanimity on the need to consolidate the steps taken toward peace. Without such steps, nothing will change.

Discussion

However, the discussion about the best ways of achieving it and giving it a democratic content continue in this sector. Some think that MUDAR should define itself as a pressure group and function in the political field, while others say it should be a civic body concerned only with the defense of human rights, cultural renewal, and the general lines of socioeconomic development.

The debate is an interesting one and would be enlightening if it were being freely pursued. But its future depends in part on the capacity of the parties to make themselves heard and to show that their potential is not merely theoretical.

For the time being, what seems certain is that both the government and the UNITA will be rather uninterested in elections, the same being the case with their major foreign allies. There are many imponderables, and no one is certain of winning. In the event of a totally free election, the most likely thing is that no absolute majority could be won, making agreements necessary which would render pluralism irreversible.

This issue will be an underlying factor in all the stages of negotiation, and in the thousands of informal discussions scattered throughout the various meeting points. It could even constitute a factor in the political reorganization of the country, if the advocates of democratization, both within the movements and outside them, capitalize on a historic opportunity which will probably not come again soon.

Even if there are new battles, whether purposeful or attributed to accidents (sometimes anecdotal and hard to believe), the debate about the sharing of power will continue in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It is known that the UNITA regards the positions the government is willing to allocate to it as insufficient, and as always happens in such cases, things could drag on. "As long as they are talking," it is often being said in popular circles, "at least they are not shooting and they are not pestering us."

It is true that the language the two radio stations are using has changed in some respects, and faces of individuals who were anathema just yesterday because they opposed the battle for human rights are now being seen on television.

Namibia

'Unidentified Men' Attack UN Office, Kill Guard

MB1108093289 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0929 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Windhoek Aug 11 SAPA—A security guard, Mr Michael Hohseb, 22, died when three unidentified men attacked the UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] regional office and sleeping quarters at Outjo in northern Namibia, SWABC [South-West African Broadcasting Corporation] radio news reports.

According to a police spokesman, the attack was carried out last night by two white men and a black man and it was suspected handgrenades were used.

The report said a number of shots were also fired and that the attackers were dressed in green camouflage uniforms.

According to information received by the police, one of the attackers was well built with a grey beard and dark hair. The other white man was described as slightly built with black hair. No description of the black man was supplied.

Police have requested the public to be on the look-out for a white Opel Ascona with the registration UNTAG 1152. The letters UN were painted on the door of the vehicle which is believed to have been used in the attack.

A United Nations spokesman, Mr Fred Eckhard, confirmed in Windhoek today there had been "some kind of an attack" on the UN office in Outjo and that a commercial security guard was killed in the incident.

Police in Windhoek could not be contacted immediately for further information.

'Extensive' Damage Caused

MB1108100589 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1001 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Windhoek Aug 11 SAPA—Extensive damage was caused in the grenade attack on a United Nations post in Outjo in northern Namibia in which a security guard lost his life, the UN's director for the region, Mr Ebrama Jobarteh of Gambia, said today.

The security guard of a commercial firm, Mr Michael Hohseb, 22, died in the attack on the UN general offices and adjacent sleeping quarters about 9:30 [1930 GMT] last night.

Mr Jobarich said documents and records in the office appeared to be intact.

A police spokesman, Warrant Officer Lean Rust, said the attack was carried out by two white men and a black man with phosphorus grenades. One grenade exploded in the offices and the other in the building housing sleeping quarters.

He said police were looking for a white Opel Ascona with the registration number UNTAG 1152.

The UN fleet in Namibia carries the UNTAG series registrations but the vehicle had the letters "UN" painted in blue on the sides instead of the usual black.

UN's Ahtisaari Issues Statement

MB1108105889 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1058 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Windhoek Aug 11 SAPA—The United Nations special representative in Namibia, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, said today that he deplored all acts of terrorism—whether directed against the United Nations or any other party.

"I expect all Namibians to unite in the condemnation of such acts and to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful transition to independence," Mr Ahtisaari said in a statement in Windhoek.

He was commenting on a grenade attack on UN offices at Outjo last night.

A private security guard, Mr Michael Hohseb, 22, died and extensive damage was caused in the explosions.

Mr Ahtisaari said he had despatched the director to this office, Mr Cedric Thornberry, and the UN police commissioner, Mr Steven Fanning, to assess the situation at Outjo and to report back.

"I wish to extend to the family of the guard my deep and sincere sympathy in regard to this callous and cold-blooded murder," he said.

"I and UNTAG will not be diverted from our task of supervising and controlling the implementation of Resolution 435, and will resolutely press ahead for the independence process for Namibia."

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15 Aug. 1989